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It is mycontcntionthat Mauricc Blanchot's political ontology of the artwork
(I 'oem'rt~) call for a new politics, but not a politics founded on work., power, or any
previously conceived partisan agenda. I bcginwith B1anchot'sstartingpointoflhc
question of how literarure is possible because he holds Ihis to bea questionthatcannolbe
answered. I thenestabli h Blanchot's unique ontological depiction of the anworkas
uselessandimpossiblethroughlhcphilosophicalfoundalionsofAristotle,Hegel,and
Heideggeronpotentiality(dllll"lIIis),work(Arheil),andte<:hnology (Tec/mik)
respcctively. Since Blanchot considers his artwork 10 be evidence ofan essentially
polilical refusal, I consider Blanchot under the guise of political ontology. Bynarraling
Ihe rolesofimpossibilil'y, refusal, the absence of work (desoeuvremeJlt),anddealhin
BlanchOl's theory of art as Jiterature, I show how we can derive a new politicsfromlhe
Epigraph
A philosopher who would write as a poet would be aiming for his own destruction. And
even o,hecould not reach it.
Poetry is a question for philosophy which c1nims 10 provide it with an answer, and thus to
comprehend it (know it)
Philosophy, which pUI5 everything into questions, is tripped up by poetry,which is the
question thaI eludes it.
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At least two things can be said conceming the beginning or origin of an. First,
there is the birth of something called 'an'-realized in multiple differing ways-and it
stands in relation to an anisL Secondly, there is the opponunity to renect uponwhal'an'
is and what. if anything. the anistdoes. \VhilegenernllyspeakingartiSlS are more closely
related to the fonner, liternrycritics. for example, bclong 10 the latter. Of the numerous
and varying twentieth century literary critics, MauriceBlanchot is one particularly
preoccupied with pursuingthequestioll opened up by the birth ofart: 'what is arl <lnd
what can be said about it?,2 For him, this question is essentially 0 neofbothontological
and political import. However, Blanchot is not alone in his emphasis. His writings on
literature appear amidst two other politically charged artistic trends thal are more
commonly recognized. On the one hand there is Surrealism, which takes the fonn of art
asactivismandrebellionagainstrcason.andontheolherthereislean-PauISanreand
commiffed or engaged liferafUre. In the shadows of these two popular movements,
Blanchot is l0C3ted as a marginal figure.
The surreal now occupies a hackneyed comer of the Western vernacular and the
movement itself no longer holds the fervor it once had. Spawned out of its predecessor
Dadaism. Surrealism embraced non-rationality as the essential artisticexigency.llnorder
to accomplish rebellion through an. thecssential task ofSurrealism was thedissolutionof
anydifTerence between life and an through the emergenceofsu.rreality.··Surrealityisa
kind ofimernal or universal reality,whereas objective reality is composed 0 fphenomena
which are visible to all and chaotic and uiviaJ. Bothexuemesofrealityareequally
nonrntional.',.4 Thus the goal of Surrealism is to gain access toanotherlevelofreality.
and,bydoingso,theanistrebelsagainstreason'sdol11inancethroughnonrationalmodes
of expression
TheSurrealistinduceddream-likclinconsciousstatestoprol11otecreativity. This
artislicexpericnce forSurrcalisl11 is a specific lechniqllcthat ail11sat "no barriers between
the artist's selfand what he produccs."s Surrealisl11 prioritizes the artisl as the
delenninantofartandtheartwork.Dcspileitsattcl11pttorcvolutionizeaesthctics,
Surrealism reductively places too much power for artistic creation in the hands of an
anist anempting to discover something revelatory about humankind's condition.6 Thisis
something Blanchot cannot a!low, and iswhy"Surreali tic writing and painting were to
remain experiences and not works or an.'" Blanchot primarily diverges rrom Surrealism
on the notion that an cannot be reduced to an experience or to an anisl.
Sartre, who was a contemporary of BlanchoI, founded a theoryofpolilicized
literature that shares the Surrealist' emphasisontheanistasthemostimponantsubject
Sartre'sapproachto literatureemphnsizespolilical commitment on behalrortheauthor.
He constructs his theory in opposition to the ideaor'an ror an's sake' (e.g. Surrealism)
andravors'anroroursake,'meaninganrorhumanity,whoserundamentalcondition is
theimperaliveoraradical rreedom. In his historical approach, artrealsomakesa
distinclionbelweenpoetryandprose(somelhingBlanchotdoesnolfonnallydo) because
the aim orlitcrature is to express meaning and not to merely rcpresent itbypoetic
metaphor.s In engaged literature, the writer makes language an instrumem inorderto
participate in the dialectic (or the artwork) with the reader, which, in two ways,
complelclydiITcrcntiatesSartrc'sapproachrromBlanchol's:BIanchot does not describe
artasdialecticalorlanguageastheinSlnJmcntorthewriler.Byconlrast,rorSanre,"thc
endorlanguageistocommunicate:,9
anre's writer is intent on changing the world because to bea writer means to be
directed toward action through disclosure. Hcslates,"theprose-writer isa man who has
chosen a certain method or secondary action which we may call action bydisclosure...
The 'committed' writer knows that words are action. He knows that to reveal is to change
and that one can reveal only by planning to change:·IO The fact that Same makes his
theory oflitemture oneofintenlional aims. decisive action into the worId, and the fact
that language is the subordinated tool of the writer, thus make Sanre'sengaged
IiteratrlreperhapsthepolaroppositeofBlanchot'svicw.
Blanchot primarily presents his Lreatmcntofan and the amvork in two sources:
lhecollec.ion oressays published as TheSpaceojLiterotlJre(L'EspoceLiueroire, 1955)
and thecssaywrinenin response to Sanreentitled Literatrlreand the RighttaDeath
(Litteratureetledroitalamort.1949).lnfundamentaldistinctiontoSanreand
Surrealism. Blanchotaffinns that an does not ofTer itselfas a revelalion of some poetic
essence of nature by mystic communion orSurrealitic aulomated experience.Blanchot
writes: "an anist could never ascend from the use he makes of an objcct in the world toa
picturcinwhichlhisobjecthasbecomcan."llSlancholiscritical of conceptions of an
somc sort of mystical cu!tivation, as in LhcSurrcalistprncticeofdream-induced writing
ForBlanchot,literaturei amatterofquestioning.nolcommilment.Liternture
poses an open queslion thaI is neitheranswered,nora political solutionbowinglosome
panisanend:
His attempt to provide a definition forlitemture is motivated by what he
sees as thecballenge to the legitimacyofan thai the world of work and
10 What is I.uerat"re. 37.
II The Space o/Uteratllre. 41.
Asaquestion~lileratureexistsasapowerofcontestation.Ascontestation.itessentially
refuses the grounds forpanicularchoiceand re ists being made servile forpaniculnr
(polilical)ends.ForBlanchol,thispowcrofrefusalaffinnsthemostfundamental essence
of the political and "clarifying what is peculiar and singular in this refusaJisoneoflhe
theoreticaltasksofthenewpoliticallhinking:'ll
In The COllcept ofthe Political (1927). Carl Schmitt wriles: "the political has its
own critcria which express themselves in a charactcristic way. Thepolitical must
lherefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, lowhichall action with a specifically
polilicalmeaningcanbetraced.,,14InBlanchot.thcirrcducibilityoflhcpoliticaltakcsthe
formofa rcfusal or contestation. Refusal isanimmcllloriallyconSlitutedpoliticalpower
because, as Blanchot writes, "when we refuse, we refuse with a movemenl free from
contcmptandexaltalion.onelhatisasfarnspossibleanonymous,forthepowerof
refusal is accomplished neither by us nor in our name, but from a vcry poor beginning
lhatbelongsfirstofalltol.hosewhocannotspeak.··15Thiscontestatoryapproachtothe
political finds its exigent expression in the artwork. ·'Thepoeticwork~theanisticwork.if
it peaks to us of something. speaks to us of that which is removed from all value or
repels all evaluation, articulatcs the demand of beginning (again). whichislostand
muddled as soon as it is satisfied in value.,,16
Art is art because it both rctums and responds to the queslion at its fundament,
"the point which cannot be reached,yct the only one which is\Vorth reaching.,,17T!te
question is not a challenge because challenges are met and overcome; challengesare
problemssolvedbyworking.WhiJethequeslionofanisnotachallengeto its legitimacy
either.Blanchotviewstheposingofthequestionitsclfassufficienl.Literarylegitimacy.
thus, does not lie in its ability to satisfy criteria, but rather in the surrenderingrequiredby
thcanist.lnsteadoftheanisticattcmpttosubordinateorappropriateanasa rencctive
activity, the artist can do no morc than surrendertoa vacuum ofinactionopenedupby
thcartwork.AccordingtoaBlanchotiannotionofart,theartistisalways doomed to
failurebecuusefailuredenotesnstatcwhereinilisimpossiblctoncl.Whileanartistic
cxpcricnccdclcrmined by personal possibilitycannol qualify as tmeart-becauseitis
practiccdcapacity-artisticsurrenderingisunrealizableandunsurpassable.This
enigmatic representation of BlanchOI's conceptualization of Ii terature is an endeavor to
·protect'literature,topennitititsuncompromisednon-dependence.
In order to follow the trnceofthe political in literalure. I will followBlanchot's
mcthod. heeding the question of an as unresolved. Literature is a question and itisa
question for itself: "liternture is perhaps essentially (I am not saying uniquely or
16Polltico'Writillgs.6.
17 Tht."Spacr ojLiterollJre, 54
manife tly)apowerofcontesration:contestationoftheestablishedpower.contestation of
whal is (and oflhe faCl of being), conleslalion of language and oflhe fonnsoflilerary
language,finallyconteslationofitselfaspower.',IISincelitcraturepresentsitselfasa
forever-being-put-into-questionqucstioningitsclf,theanwork escapes our maslery and
shatters our horizon of expectations in a way that is disastrously calastrophic.In lhe
forewordtoa recently published collection ofBlanchol'spolitical writings, Kevin I-Ian
writes that Blanchot is anracted to literature in pan becauseofilS power of contestation
since it poinLS to the shared source of politics and art 8S something like 'communism
bcyond communism,' oras I concciveofit: something cOfosfrophicolly new. 19
The IYrilingoflheDisasler(L'£critureduDesoslre. 19 0) is Blanchot'sbook
thal spccificallytakes up literature amilascatastrophc, but I believethecalaStrophic
nature of literature is evident in much earlier works, like 111eSpaceo/Lilerafllre.20 While
the question of art is not a challenge Lobc metandovercome,ncither iscatasLrophc to be
confused with crisis, which is a kind of challenge. Jnlmpossible£xchange(1999),Jean
Baudrillard defines catastrophe as "the irruption ofsomcthing which no longer functions
according to the rules, or functions by rules we do not know, and perhaps never will.
othingissimplycontradictoryorirrationalinthisstate;everythingisparadoxical."ZI
Baudrillard'sdefinitionishelpful in two ways. First. both catastrophe andliteratureofTer
themselves as unknowable and unforeseeableorunintentional,which irnplicates both of
thernasilllpossible.Secondly.thenotionofparadoxicalilllpossibility, as opposed to
contradictoryimpossibility,isalsosignificantforBlanchot'sconccptualizationof
literaturebecauseBlanchotcharacterizestheanworka impossibleintheseneofa
practical illlpossibility. Contradictory impossibility is moreconceptuallystrictthan
paradoxical impossibility, which is much Icss demanding. This isevidentin passagcs
from The Writing a/the Disaster, where he writes: "the disaster ruins everything, all the
while leaving everything intact.,.22
Catastrophe possesses an inherent political connotation. a dimensionoften
nssociatcdwithpolitical instability. Although Baudrillard cmphasizes the societal
progrcssioll from crisis into what is llowa state of catastrophe (according to him. wcurc
no longcr facing a crisis, but rathercatastrophe),the rclatiol1 ofcatastTOphclocrisisand
the latcnt, yet manifest. struggle of contradictions (Ihcrc arc foreseeableresolutionston
crisis. but not to a carastrophe) can be funhcrcarried over to Ihe writing experience.2J
Nexltorefusal,lhecataslropheconstilulesthesinglemostsignificantnotionfor
understanding the politics of literature.
So as to retain the significance and idiosyncratic nature of the anwork in
8lanchot'sview, I will retain the original Frenchdesignationof/'oeuvrefortheartwork.
For Blanchot the anwork is not to be thought of in termsofwork,as in a labor.L'oelll're
i meant to connote how "the work says nothing, communicates no message exterior to
itself. BUI it nevertheless is. ,,~4
The formulation of/'oeul'reand its impossible and politicaldimensionrequires
the consideration of Blanchot's canonical philosophical predecessors. lntheensuing
chap1cr, I will elucidatel'oeul're in terms of Aristotle, G. W. F.Hegel.and Manin
Heidegger, all of whom are latent influences on Blanchot'sarti ticconsiderationoflhe
political. Then, in what will follow, I will explore the imponance of death for literature's
onlologicalformulationinlheanwork.therelationsofreadingliternturewilh respect 10
the fonna1ion of community, and thecatastrophicnatureorJiterntureitself.
2~ThcOttiologyoILileralfm!.22
Implicitly and explicitly. Blanchotdrawsupon three philosophers in continuous
and repeated ways in his work. J will proceed chronologically and in a manner most aptly
considered narrative. The first historical matter is Aristotelian potentiality(dunamis),a
partofthepurposefulprocessofactualily(el1ergeia).Thesecondisl-legel's master-slave
(HerrscllaftlmdKl1eclltscllaft)dialectic,essentialfortheexpl icationofwork(Arbeit)and
dcath. Work,as will be shown, isantithclical to art, butdcath islikelyart'smoslessenlinl
aspccl(lhavcdevotedtheentirclyoflhcncxlchaplcrtoitsplaceinBlanchot'spolilical
aesthclics).Thcthirdconsidcration is Hcideggeron lechnology (TecJmik) and art. For
Heidegger,anandlcchnologyshareacommonfoundalionelucidatedthrough the
etymology of the Greek word tecJme. TecJmedenoles both theskillsandactivitiesofthe
anistandthecraftsman~butisconsideredbyHcideggerasawayofknowingandnolof
making (Machel1 or productivity). Although Blanchot and Heideggershare a common
emphasis on poeuy, BlanchotditTers from Heideggeron the relation ofan to possibility.
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is exhausted by its actuality because actuality i lheendorreasonforwhichaprocessis
undergone. Thus,"actualityhas priority not only over potentiality but 0verevery
principleofprocess.'JI
Apotentialityholds,furtherrnore,despitcathing'spossibilityforobtaining.ln
othcrwords,animpossibilitY,ifconceivedasapracticalimpossibilityandnotalogicnl
one,canhavepotenlial.Theconncctionbetwcenpracticalimpossibilityandpotenliality
is evidenced inlhetwofoldnatureofpotcntiality,wherein potentiality is always also and
alreadyimpotentiality:
An actuality is as no longer nor yet and whatcvcrhasthcpotenlia1of being also hns the
pOlential of not being
We can disccm how potentiality can be used to grant existence to something
elusive, like I'oelll're: "it isapolentialitythat is not simply the potential 10 do this or that
thing but polential to not-do. potential not to pass into actuality...))
According to AristoLle, potentiality concerns matters of process where a process is
conceived ofas a potentiality beingexhausled intoactuality;"the fact is lhat lheacfuality
of an object is its obroining.,J4 The example Aristotle provides is the reIationofastatue
to the wood from which it could be carved. The statue exists as potentiality in thewood,
but whether or not it obtains depcndson whether or not thesUltue is carved(Le.
actualized) by the anist. In other words, since an exhausted potentialityisanactuality,an
actuality is as no longer nor yet. The statue exists potentially in thewoodasnotyet,and
inpanicular:asnotnecessarilyyet.Forthestatuetoobtain,itsactuality must be realized
because "everyoutputofa production progresses towards a principle,towardsanend ...
The end is rhe ocmoliry:JS Therefore, in tenns ofa process of actualization, something
lhat remains solely potentially extant does not exist in tennsofsome desired end;itexislS
only as not yet and it need not necessarily obtain. This provides the groundforlhewayin
which we can conceive ofa practical impossibility with respect to some kind of process.
In Giorgio Agamben's view, commensurate with Blanchot's writings,
"potentiality has never ceased to function in the life and historyofhumanity, most
tlotably in that part of humanity that has grown and developed its potcncy 10 the point of
imposing its powcrover the whole planct.,J6 Agambcn's insislcnceonthecontcmporary
saliencyofpotentialityresonaleswithBlanchot'streatmentofthcquestion of art as open.
Since art is, in Blanchot's view, the ever-elusive aspect of human Iife,wecansccwhy
potentiality matters to him. Basically, potentiality allows us to conceiveofBlanchot's
peculiarartwork,/'oeuvre. as not ever having to nccessarily obtain or not everhaving
necessarily obtained; it is essentially subordinate to no-thing.
L'oeUl'reis not theoUlcome ofa process in the sense ofa labor of means to ends.
This is evident in the original French text of The Space o/Literature whereinBlanchot
uses Ie trm'ail distinctly from I 'oeuvre. Letravaildenotes work 0 r labor in terms of
powcr,possibility,and the ability to personally appropriate and transformsomethingin
the world. Ann Smock. in her translator's introduction to Blanchot's Space,comments
trami/isdiametricallyopposed to inaction and passivity, l'oeUl're requi.res them.'J7 1f
indeed roeu\'re is to be understood in terms of having potentiality, meaning that it can be
ornotbe,then it cannOl becomprehcnded as a work in terms of Ie travail. What mattcrs
is that an isdifficull,stubbom,that it can not be as impotential.Therefore, I'oeul're is
impossible as a practical (and not a logical) impossibility. Ifitisnotworkthatmatters,
then what can wcsayoftheanistic proccss in thc casc of Blanchot? TIlcanswerisfound
in worklcssnessor inoperativeness, that is, lheabsenceofwork:desoellvrement
Desoellvrementisesscnlialtothcwritingprocessbecausc"lowrite is to produce
absenceofthcwork (worklessness)."JS An is conceived of by BIancholasanunsettled
question and henceuthe work by itselfcan discover only theabsenceofan.',39Thc
abscnceofan means an as impotential,as not yet, and it is in this sense thatanis
impossible. L 'oeUl're is intentionallyunrealizeable"and becauseofthis, when the work
takes itself to be the taskofgmsping an in its essence. the impossible is it:s task.andlhc
worki onlyrealizedasaninfinitesearching.',40WhalisfundamentalforBlanchot's
nOlionofanisthatL'oel/l'reanddesoelll'rememaresynonymousandthisis
commensurate with the consequence of an as the impossibly impolcntial.
As something impolential or impossible,/'oem're is passive, nOlactive,and
therefore nondialeclical. 'The potcntial welcomes non-Being, and this welcoming of non-
Beingispotentiality,fundarnentalpassivity,ltispassivepolenliality,butnolapassive
polentialily that undergoes something other than itself; rather, itundergoesandsufTersits
own non.Being:~1 Passivity means a withdrawal instead of an imposition. This essential
withdrawal-the withdrawal fromfofexpe:rience, production, power, possibility,andso
on-is a passive movement, not an aClive one. While a dialectic is dynamicallyactivc,a
passive movement is nondialectically latent and unequivocallyparadoxical
Thenondialectical status of art is a way in whi hBlanchotdifferenliateshis
into a dialeclic, As a paradoxical passivitYt/'oeuvre callnOI be reduced to an artist's
intenliolls, means, or desired ends. For Blanchot,"the work cannotbeplanned,butonly
carried out" and therefore to bea writer. 'towrile,' means 10 havealreadybeenwriting."z
By situating Blanchotwith respect to Hegel's infamous master-slave dialecticfrorn
Phenomen%gyo/Sprit(1807),theway in which art isnondialecticaI and/'oeul're is
impossiblcshouldbecometranslucenl.bulnotoverlydelcnnined.
2.2. Work and Passivity
ThroughthelecturesdeliveredbyAlexandreKojeveinlhe 1930s,lhinkerslike
Blanchot, anre,andGeorgesBataillereceivedapanicularreadingorinlerpretationof
HegersPhenomenologyoJSpirif.Kojeveconceivedofthemaster-slave dialectic as
being the mOSI significant aspect of Hegc)'s lreatise. Hege)'sPhellome11ologyisan
Desire.',43 Self-<:onsciousness is desirc. a consciousness capable ofconrrastingitsclfwith
something external. However, the external object in question cannot be any external
object whatsoever becausc "se/f-cor,sciollsnessachiel'es ilssOIisjacliono"Iyin anolher
se!Fconsciousness.'o4'*Thus, self-consciousness needs, desires, anddemandsanother elf-
recognition from man.',4S In this way, Ihe encounter bclwcen self-consciousnessesisan
intrinsically social phenol11cnon bccausc"thecondition of sci f-consciousncss is the
cxistcllceofotherself-collsciousnesses.,.46
Hegel posits that self-consciousness desires recognition. "Self-consciousness
existsinandforitselfwhen.andbythef3clth31.ilsoexi ts for another; that is, itcxislS
only in beingacknowledged:.,47 In the meeting of two consciousnesses, eachdesiring
rccognition from the other, a struggle ensues for at least two reasons. First. in the initial
encountertheabilitytosatisfyone'sdesire(s)iscompromisedbecausein the other one
confront's"somethingthat has an independent existence of it own,which,therefore,it
cannot utilize for ilS own purposes:t48 Second. in the initialencounterbetween
consciousnesesthereisnoexposureofwhatHegelcalls"purebeing-for-seW'orself-
consciousness. In order for this self-consciousness to be presented in it5 'pure' fonn, it
must show how it is not attached to material. necessary life:
The attachment to the body isexpresscdbyourdesire for preservation• which relatcs us
to animals; sincc the realiryofthcmastcr-slavedialcctic pertains to human reality,
"Human Desire, therefore, must win out over this desire for preservation:·50This
encounter dcpicts what is essential to human reality and marks the way in which the
human reality begins with the struggle for recognition. This bcginning mustinvolvethe
wager of death through theriskingofone's life because man "is capable of risking his
life and thereby frceing himself from the only slavery possible. ensJavementto Jife."j1
The willingness to risk the living body by wagering death in the face of the 0 ther
instigates··thistrial bydeatb.'·5Z Death must be ri ked because "jflife is the natural
position of consciousness. lhendcalh is merely ilSnaturnl negalion."5JFunhermore,death
provides lhe gatcway to winning freedoJn,sincc"it isonlythroughstakingonc's life thnt
freedom iswon.',j4 Freedom is essential because the encounter with theather,foreign
consciousnesslhreatens my ability for self-assertion and inner pre-eminence;thati ,for
purebeing-for-self.
By assening the need forself-eonsciousness to engage incombal, Hegel makes
violencc a vital component of his philosophy. This has the consequence 0 fviolencebeing
an essential facet of human life. However, "in order that the human reality come into
being as 'recognized'reality,bothadversaries must remain alive after the fighl.,,55 The
actunl,rcalizcddenthoftheotherisnotpreferablebecauscthenthe victor would have no
source for recognition, which was precisely what initiutcd lhe combat in thc first pluce.
"Death is the nalllral negation ofconsciousncss, negation wi thoutindependence,which
thus rCIl111ins wilhout the required significancc of recognition."56Conscquently, both
consciousncsses ll1ustsurvive. The victor must spare the life of the other. What results is
that one emerges the victor as the independent master and the otheremergessubordinate
and dependent as the slave
Byhis position as master, the master is free from necessity. since. unlike the
slave, he was not willing to submit to lhe desire forpreservation;H Furthermore, because
the slave is there in service of the master, the master is no longerrequiredtosuhmitto
providing for his bodily life's necessary needs. "Servile labor is the 10tofthe lave,who
in that way arranges lhe world so that the master can negate it purely and simply, that is,
enjoy it. The master consumes the essence oflhe world; the slave elaboratesit.,,58 Sut
although the master is pUl in the superior social position hy proving victoriousinthe
struggle, he has not achieved recognition. The slave isjust a thing in theeyesofthe
master and recognition requires an independent consciousness, which theslaveisnol.
··Theslaveisforhimananimalorathing.Heis,lherefore,'recognized'byathing.Thus,
finally, his Desire is directed toward a thing, and not-as it seemed at first-toward a
(human) Desire:,s9 By holding the slave in subjection, the masterisliftedfromlhe
burdens of having to labor out ofnccessity, but ut the priccofthc insufficient recognitioll
from a 'Ihing.' The slave, on theotherhand,isbound to llcccssitybyhis place in the
socialhicrarchy;theslavcistheoncwhomutwork
idle. merely enjoying, consuming the things prepared for him. The master"takesto
himelfonlythedependenlaspeClofthethingandhasthepureenjoymenlOfil.The
aspectofilS independence he leaves to the bondsman. who works on it.·.60Theslave's
independence over things through work becomes the tumingpoint in what has so far been
a one·sidcd dichotomy. "By working, the Slave become master of Nature," and, hin
transforming the given World by his work,"the slave "transcends Ihegiven and what is
given by lhat given in bimself; hence. hegoe beyond him elf. and also goes beyond the
Master who is tied to the given which, not working, he le3ves intacl.,061 While the fear of
dC3th initially relegated the slave to his posilion subordinate tothe master. the capacity to
work-meaning to transform, shape, 3J1d fashion nature or material objects-has given
the slave a power much grealerthan thaI exercised indolently by the master,This is why
"mcrrllthofautonomousConsciousnessisslav;shConsc;OlJsness:062
True achievement in the dialectic of master and slave belongs to the slave who
holdslhepowerofwork.AccordingtoHegel,"workfonllsandshapes the thing" and
through labor, the worker recognizes himselfin hisefrol1s independently.63
Therefore, what matters in the master-slave dialectic is how work allows the slave to
achieve the recognilion originallydesircd. This is accomplished through the slave's work.
whereinhecomestoidentifyhimselfinthings.meaningtheproduclSofhislabor. his
precisely on the frontier of Hegel's prioritization of work that I wish tosiruate
desoeuvrememastheabsenceofworkbecausedesoeuvrememisessentially I 'oeuvre.
It is helpful to begin with thcabscnce of work as antithetical towork,which
produccsproducts."Theproductofworkisthcworker'sproduction.ltis the realization
of his project, ofhis idea; hcncc. it is hc that is realized in and by thisproduct.'.65
According to Hegel, work is activity wherein the worker comes to recognize himself in
the produclSofhis laboring and this is the truth of the slave in the master slave dialectic:
"it is by work, and only by work, that man reali=es himselfobjectively as man.'-66
Through the transfonnation of material things, a fundamenml and objectiverevelation
transpires which provides the grounds for the consLitution of the essential human rcality.
Thus the LnJthofwork is negation. "Man isnegatingAcfioIJ,which transfonnsgivcn
Beingand,by transforming it, transforms itself.,,67 This negatingactionistheactivityof
work. In Hegel's view expounded in the Phellomenology, negation l ransfomls the givcn
or material things through labor, as in the activity of the slave. Yct.iftheartworkisthe
product of the artist, then by what proccssdo the two coalesce in the productionofan?
Once again, as it was with impotentiality. pas ivity i at the hean afthe matter.
While work in the Hegelian sense means action-that is. a transformative.
intentional action carried out into objective realization bya consciousness-/'Delll"reas
desoeul'remelll means passivity (Le. action's antithetical opposite). While work is the
actualization of an idea, passivity is the inactionofimpolentiali ty.ToseehowBlanchot's
artwork is not a product of (an artist's) working, it is necessary lO establ ish how it is that
For Blanchotan "indicates what one might undersland as the playofthenon-
actual wilhintheaclual,lhereservethatdoesnotreveal itself.'o6lIl-Iere,non-actualilY
denotestheimpotentialilyoftheabscnceofworkinherentin/'oelJl're,but I donolwish
toconstruclanespeciallyantagonisticbinarybetweenworkand/'oem'reor
or deficiency, which is whydesoeUl'remem is not nothingness. Work constructs.
aims to fill thal gap by introducing work. However, the non-aclual within the actual-
{tesoellvreme", (or I'oellvre) demands a kind ofundclcnllined opcnness,that is, lhc
opennessofimpOlentialily.Thcrefore,l'oellvreisalackinICrmsofwork's abscncc as
purepassivity.69
As the passively non-actual,I'oem're is the absence of work anddesignatesthe
space ofsomethingthal cannot bc inlegrated inlo a consciousness aiming to be aClive.
DesoelJl'remem in no way produces I'oellvre, for Blanchot seems quite explicit in
divorcing art fromproduclion. that is, from the products produced through work.
L'oelll're is not the resultofanartist'sintenlionalityand the anworkis not a prodUCl of
tcleologicalactivity.
The Hegelian dialectic is driven by contradiction, not paradox:
Incontrnst,l'oelll'reisnondialecticallyundetennined.ltisanopen'answer'tolhe
queslionofan."ltistosurrenderlotheindislinClandlheundelennined,totheempliness
anteriortoevents.wheretheendha all the heaviness of starting over... \Vhat is firsl is
not beginning but beginning over. and being is preciselylhe impossibiliryof beingforlhe
firstlime.,,7IHere,whereanreigns,writingmeanstobeforsakenofpossibilityandlo
passively undergo a workless impossibility: the paradox
L'oellvre is aimless, unproductive, passive, and inactive. Nonc of these features provides
assist3nceinfomlalizingsomcdctcrminalcanswcrtothcqueslion of art. Yet, this
problematic is precisely why the question of art cannot be sCllled.Ifwereallymustscttle
thequeslion,lhenwe muslsimplyallow it to subsist as un cttledandleaveillhere.
undelcnnined.Worksetllesandsolveslhingsbyovercomingthem;dcstruction,
assimilation, and lrnnsformalion areconstitulive of the Hegeliannolion of work enacted
byncgation.72 By nOl seuling the question ofanand delcnnining its supposedanswcr,we
allow a space for thal which we cannot subsume because il always eludes us.
For Hegel, language is at the hean of the origin of the human realitybccause
humanrealityisfoundedonthecapacitytobringfonhone'sself-<:onsciousnessinto
languagebypronouncing'I.·7J lnordertonamesomething.thethingmust be negated,
meaning destroyed or transformed in its present given tateintosomethingnewwithin
which one recognizes one's own activity.
According to Blanchot, lilcmture presents us wilh somethingessenliaJ.but
somcthing essentially ambiguous and indeterminate. "SurrealislS understand,moreover,
that language is not an inen thing: ithasa lifeofitsown,anda latent power that escapes
us.',"14 Jfthere is indeed something elusive in writing-literary language-then this is
precisely that play of the non-actual within the actual. Following the Surrealist who heeds
him or herself before the power of language, Blanchot writes: "IetuS suppose that
literature beginsal Ihe moment when literature becomes a question," and, "this question
is addressed 10 language.,,75 Inotherwords,lhcremust indeed besomelhing
onlologicallyrevelatoryatlributablelolitcrmureintcnnsof/'oeuvre.
Blanchotdescribesliteratureinterm ofaparadoxicalmovementinorderto
emphasize how I 'oeuvre can never be intentional and to protect an from technological
anifice.76 Althoughdetermincd use perseveres to cover the vast domain of all things,
"there belongs to man, stich as he is, such as he will be, an essenliaIlackfrol11whichlhis
right to pllthimselfin question, and always in qllestion, comes. ,,71 There will always be
this workless lack and it is in the artwork lhat we encounter this insufficiency in
ablindance.Therefore,whatisprimordialforlaborcannotbethe same as what is
primordialforarLlnthisway,senselessnessisprioritizedbeforesense,meaninglessness
before meaning, and uselessness before use. Todemonstrale the way in which I 'oeuvre is
lIseless and how it refuses to be overtaken (by technology),a discussionofHeidcgger's
influence on Blanchot is necessary. This inollencewillbedevelopedinthefollowing
chapter on death
Work is always useful. Work describes the process of means and ends wherein
some particular means aims toward generaling a desired result or end. Work does not
conccmitselfwithuselessactivitybecausewaywardncssisnotproductive.While
malerial things can evidencc their obvious and inherent usefulness,lllostoftenthings
need to bc madeuscful. In other words, somelhing is rendercd usefulbyaprocessof
making."A being that falls under usefulness is always the product 0 fa process of
making. It is madeasa piece of equipment for something... Thisnamc[cquipment]
designates what is produced expressly for employment and use."78 This process of
making (manllfacturing) is distinctive of what Heideggerconsidersmoderntcchnology.
In The QlIestion Co"cemi"g Tech"ology(1953). Heideggerdescribestwo
commonplace definilions of technology andsrates that the two together constitute one
suflicient explanation to the question: what istcchnology? "Onesays:Technologyisa
means to an end. The other says: Tcchnology is human activity. Thc two definitions of
tcchnology belong together. For to posit cnds and procure and utilize lhe means to them
is a human activity.,,79
BlanchOl describes technology as "the penury of being beeome the power of man,
the decisivc sign ofWestcm culture.'.sD If an is autonomous and protected from useful
calcgory oftcchnology or work. Ifan is to be separale from the category 0 ftechnology.
then wcshould not conceive of it in tcnnsofhuman activity or instrumentation. What is
csscntialatthcmomcmistodistinguishthebook(leliw"e)from/'oellvreand::l.!sothc
book from a 1001 ror achieving litcralure. According 10 Blanchot, Ihebookprccedes
/'oeuvreand nevcr the reverse; there is firsl the book asmaterialily,mcaningprinted
wordsonpaper.lr/'oellvreprccedcdlhebook,then/'oellvrewouldhave to exist
berorehand as an ideal belongingloaconsciousness;/"oellvrewouldbe reduced toa
humanidea."Heideggerisessentialforunderstandinghowitisthat I'oelll're cannot be
InhisessayTheOrigillofthelVorkofArt(1935-1936l,Heideggerposesh i own
version of the question of an: "how is illhatanexistsatall?",S2 Sianchot's answer would
likely besomelhing like the following: does an_or something called an, properlycxisl?
Or, we can refer to a statement given by Blanchot in Tlte Space ofLiteramre: if there is
omething called an, ifart cxislsm all, then whether or not we ever have it cannot be
dctcnnined; "'to Ihequestion therccan be no rcsponse:"J Hcrcin lies a pointofdifTerence
betweenJ-leidegger'sandBlanchol'slrCatmcntofart'squestion.Whileinthecaseof
Blanchot we have a fairly ambiguous conception of the anwork (whose essencelam
attempting to narrate), Heidegger is much more affinnalive, writing: "an is truth seuing-
itselftowork.,084 For Heidegger, art is lhe revealing or happening of tnlth.whichislhus
made present and apprehended by a kind of knowing; this knowing istecJme. TecJ",eis
featured both in The Origin ofthe Work ofArt and The Question Concerning Technology.
I will bcginwith his analysis frolTIlhclattcrcssay.
In ordcr to grasp what makes technology somclhing tcchnologicaI,Heidegger
t:lkes up the etymological significance oftecJ"'e with respect to the morefamiliartenn
'technology.' However. his interest is primariJy in the essence of technology. which he
affinns to be nothing Icchnological. Heidegger'sdiscussionshifistheemphasisfrom
technology as a usefuJ,purpose driven activity to that strange realm of art, where useno
longer holds ilS etTective sway. Hewritcs:
The word siems from the Greek. Tecl",ikoll means that which belongs to
techlle. We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this
The etymological significance ofteclme reveals an interconnectednessbetween
technology and art, which are two seemingly disparate areas. Yet,teclmedoes not denote
ourmodemsenseoflechnologyasaninstrumentalizedacnlalizationofhumanaclivity;
tecll1le,accordingtoitsGreekorigins,isllotthemakingwecallworking."Forteclme
signifies neither craft nor art, and not at all the technical in our presentMdaysense;itnever
meansakindofpracticalperformance ... techneneversignifiesthe action ofmaking.,,86
TheoriginalityofteclmereferstothecraftofLheartisl,whoisacreatorinamodewe
must think differently from that of the maker
Theartistascreatorpracticesakindofcraft,but"theGreeks,who knew quite a
bit about works of art, use the same word tecl111e for craft and art and callthecraftsman
and the artisl by the same name: teclmites.,,87 Slit while the worker-maker makes things
by vir1"lIe of his or her very activity and comes to see the products as the fruits of their
labor, the artist-creator is engaged in a difTerent projectwilh respecttowork,in
Heidegger'sview. "In Ihework,createdness is expressly createdintolhecreatedbeing,
so that il stands out from it, from the being thus brought forth,inanexpresslyparticular
way," but Heideggergoeson 10 state that "the emergence of ereatednessfromthework
does nol mean that the work is to give the impression of having beenmadebyagreat
artiSI.,,88 Therefore, lhe artwork must be autonomously self-assert iveinitsaffirmation
Blanehotwillinmanywaysarticulateasimilarpositiononarttolhatof
Heidegger.Forinstanee,theybothsharelheemphasisonartaspoetry, but in particular,
aspectsofTheSpaceojLileralureappearasare-presentationof Heidegger'sefTortsin
The Origin ojlhe Work ofArl. However, Blanchot does make a clear break with
HeideggeronthenotionofdealhandlwillelaborateonthisdifTerenee in lhechapter
immediately to follow. Inasense,Blancholtakesastepfurtherinto the unknown (or the
lIselessorthe impossible) oflhe artwork Ihan Heideggerand he thoroughlydifferentiales
himsclfby this effort
The artwork is not an object of which we can make lise; it refuses useful
appropriation through an autonomous affirmalion of uselessness, of,Jesoellvremel11.lf
workisalwaysuseflll,thenartisalwaysuseless.UArt,uselesstolhcworldwhereonly
efTeclivencsscounts,isalsouselessloitself.,,89BecauseartislIseless il is also the space
ofdesoel/vremenland by refusing to beuseful,artasserts its autonomy from theartisl
"Thisdemand,lhatartbeineffective.isbynomeansavaintlightwhichtherewollidbe
no need to take seriously. NOlhing is more important than lhisabsolute autonomy which
isrefusal.,,90 For Blanchot, the illlplicationofan artistic autonOlllyofrefusalreachesits
fllllestcondensalionindealh."Evcrywork.andeachmomentoflhework, puts
everylhing into question all over again; and thus he who Illust liveonly forlhe work has
no way to live. Whatever he does, the work withdraws him from what he does and from
whal he can do:·91
Inmynextchapter.lwillemphasizctheplaceofdealhinBlanchot's
conceplualizalionofliterature.Whilenegationisdestructiveand dependent on death (as
in the Hegelian master-slave dialectic},death a thedestructionorendofathingisnot
the only way in which to conceive of death. Work is possible,bul" oeUl're. like theotlter
dealh,is impossible; lhere is death as the unavoidable limiloflife,but there is also an
ollterdeathor··thedeathwithoutdeath,.. thatcannotbeappropriatedbyconsciousncss.92
For Blanchot. the most literarily relevanl impossibility is thisollterdeath.
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InLirerorureondtheRighttoDeotlr,Blanchotwritesthattheesence ofliternture
is silence and nothingness, but not nothingness in the sense of Hegelian desire.94
According to GeotTrey Hartman. Blanchot'simportnnceasa literary theorist. his literary
criticism, and his comments on literatu.re in general are based upon the essential
nothingnessofliteratureitself,anothingnessthatcoexislSwithfuIlness.95 A coextcnsive
rclalionbclwcen fullness and nothingness means thai in/'oem>reanencounterwith
nothingness in all its fullness occurs. There is no dOllbt oflhc paradoxical crux of this
chamctcrization and it has implications,
The essential nothingnessoflitcrature implies the emergence ofa new and strange
(irnaginaryorfictive)worldbythedenialandignornnceofallthatisfarniliar.lnother
words. the woridof/'oelll're is one that refuses what is familiar to us as everyday and
commonplace. Fullness is attributed to accessing something completely new. However.
the fullness of this literary nothingness is also silence. Forinslance,aspeakerwhois
connectedwithasubjectivepersonalityinthefonnofan'J'haspossibilitiesandthesc
possibilitiescanbebroughtintoactionintheworld,aslhaveshownin the previous
chapter. But what happens when there is noone, meaning no 'I: speaking? \Vhat kind of
place is it that demands the inability to act because there isno foundation withinand
upon which to aCl? These are the kinds ofconcems Blanchotconceivesofasessentialto
literature. where ilencecorrelates with the death of the author, an impersonal speaker,
and the peculiar pull the space oflitcrarure has on its3udience. Nothingness represents
the kindof\\'orldlessness that is necessary in order forlitcrature to ofTer itselfupwilhout
possibility and deliver the imaginary world of the recit [narrative or tale].96
In the essay··What is an author?" Michcl FOllcaultdenotesthedeathof the author
as being a major theme in contemporary wriling. The disappearance of the subject is a
Irend linked specifically with death. In literature,"thc work of the writer is redllced to
nOlhingmore Ihan the singularity of his absence; he must aSSlIme the role of the dead
muninthegameofwriting.,,97 Butwhydocslitcmlurerequireadeathonthepartoflhe
allthor?''Thepoetl11ustrenounceallmediatcpossc'sionsandisthusyieldeduptoa
cMsoeuvrememsoLotal,thatitdeservesthenamcofdeath:,98 Whatlhavepreviously
c1aimedas'thedeathoftheauthor' is the imposition Ihrustupontheartistby I'oeuvre's
nccessaryimpersonality,an impersonality fundamcmal for the autonomousself-assertion
of Blanchot ian art. In the writer's surrender to the impossibility at the core of the
worklessoem're, the writer undergoes a kind of death. but this death must be thought of
in tennsofits literary impossibiliry, rntherthan its human possibility, as lwill how.
Silence is also a condition of impersonality and is one way to conceiveofa
literary death because the author is neither encountered in the text nor in a close and
careful readingof/'oeuvre. Silence is often misTeCognized as authorial tone. but evcn
lhoughBlanchotsaysthatitlypicallymarksthclroccofagreatwriter,silence'stonality
docs not belong to the author; it is not the product of an author's work,but pernaps the
sufTering he or she undergoes in the writing experience itself:
An essential silcnce means that languagceludcsthcllllthor'scapllcity to seize and
approprialclitcraryspeechaSfll11canillgflilpower(e.g.col11l1lunication).Languagc,or
litcraryspccch,isnotwithillthcnuthor'scapacityforintentional action becausc it isnol
revelatory of self-consciousness. Silencc's speech. which is the speech of no one
speaking. is a condition thrust upon Ihcwritcrlhroughlhcstrugglcwith writing ilsclf.
This struggle is thc writer's wreslling with impersonality in lhe formofa literary death,
wherein the writer is dismissed from I·oeuvre. L'oelll'recannot cling to theauthor
anymore than the writercandesperalcly hold on to it; they are not appendagesofonc
another. but rather/'oem'reis independent and self-subsistent so as to maintain its
ambiguous relation 10 tbe real world of things and activities; here,it has the relation of
" TheSpaceo/Lilermure, 26-27.
non-relation. In addition. while silence means that the author iS not the speaker in
literature. neither is there the potential for any other attributablespeakereither:"language
no longer has anything to do with the subject it isan object that 1eads us and can lose
US.,,100 As the condition of the writing experience. silence is essentialforunderstanding
the relationship between writing and death. I01
The self-subsistence and impersonal ontological status of I 'oeuvre requires that
literary speech speak nothing but being: UiS. 102 L'oelll're is thereforeakindofimmanent
object inasmuch as it neither depends upon nor references nor representstheworldandiLs
objects. Anauthor'shiddenmeaningisneverdetenninablenordecipherable because the
literary work never says more. never expresses anything more, thanbeing'ssolitudcor
art'sself-affinnation (both of which refuse our grasping).lOJ L'oeuvredoes not even
divulgc a sense of compietcness and this inability 10 resolve the status of art is
fascinating. like wrestling with the interminable. I04 Ratherthan 'the possible' being the
objecloffascination.Blancholdescribestheobjccloffascinalionasimpossiblcbecause
possibility rctains an infcrencetoward realizable finalitythat I'oellvrecannot allow
Fascination is significant for art in general-art has always fascinaIcdus-butitis
paramount for understandillg lileratureas Blanchotconceives it. since fascination mcans
"the shattering possession by something that has slid outsideofaII meaning and all
truth."IO' If indeed literature isc3tastrophic,then fascination is the experienceof
catastrophe in the fonnofan uUer thefi of meaning where fascination's object is
As silence is I'oeuvre's impersonal tonality-the divulgence of nothingbut
immanent being-nothingness is itsgifi in the fonnoflitcrature's incomprehensibility.
While silence is indeed essential for understanding the essence ofliterature,nothingness
is the more significant of the two. I06 Thegifi of nothingness isa way toapproachthe
qucstionofart:
We are fascinated by what we do not recognize and what we do not know, bUI Blanchot
takeslhisinvolvedperplexityfuI1herbyamnningthalourfascinationwith the unknown
and unfamiliar in literature isdue to the emergence ofthc impossiblyunknowablcin
literature itself. In other words, weare fascinated by the absence of an answer 10 the
question of literature.
ForBlanchot,fascinationistheexperienceofmeaning'sinvalidation and it is
closelyconnccted to the anistic experience of both reading and writing. Writ ingentails
the surrender to the impersonality of silence, but also the surrender to impossibility's
affinnation. Where only being speaks there can be no past, present. furure,orbeing-
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familiarmanner.Theobjectoffascinationisimpo ible and literary language does not
confonn to a correspondence between meaning and the world.
othingness is also implicated in another kind of strangeness, which is thealterity
of the artwork itself,akindofOlhemess that requires a total negation or cancelling out of
thefamiliarworld,ofallthatisgiventoconsciousness.Blanchotwrites,"poctryhas
nothing to do with the world in which we live, which is, at least inappearance,a world of
things completely made. Thence the primacy of the imaginary. thecaII for the marvelous.
theinvocationofthesurreal.,,111
Fascination contributes to the peculiarityofa literary work by refusing the
everyday; thisconlributes to itsworldlessness. Worldlessnessis therefusalofwhatis
f3miliartousinthesenseoftheeveryday;itisremovalanddistancing from the real
world of action imoan imaginary world:
Fascination signals the poim oftransfom13tion where a gazc that wasonceconsideredin
temlsofpossibility transitions to impossibility. Fascination robs and remits only
unreOectivity in the fonnofincomprehensibility.
Blanchot says that a writer must cnter into an affinnation ofsolitudc's realm: the
it isof/'DeIll're.·"To write," he says:
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BlanchotofTerspoetryasanexampleofthisambiguouslilcrarydesign.Thepoemandils
fascinating sway are defined by the fact that the poem's significat ion is dependent on
misunderstanding, rather than understanding. I 14
Examples of poetry's elusive nature are never far from Blanchot'sthought
Bataille'sThelmpossible(1962),whichoriginallyheldlhelitleTheHorredojPoelly,"'
evokes thc impossibilily at the heart oflitcralurc. In order for the imaginary world of
lileraturetonourish,therealworldofpowcrandpossibilitymust be dismissed in what
both Blanchotand Batailleconsiderto be a tOlal negation orglobaI death. In other words,
for the realization ofl'oeuvre, something cataslrophic musl OCCurbeyond the merely
individllal death of the allthor, which is generally a kind of sol itarydismissal
In order for the writer to allow fascination to manifest through languageandfor
an audience of readers 10 encounter fascination's realm of sensedeprivation,an
imaginary world must be born. The imaginary is not the commonplaceness of banal life
Literature necessitates a denial of the everyday and it is accomplishedbywhatBlanchol
calls a global negation: a negation that is total in cvery sense of theword. 116 This
comprehensivedestructioncastsofftheworldfromthemaleriality of the book and
establishes a relation with it that can oniy be undcrstood asdistanceitself,whichpennits
the aIteri ty of the work to become manifcsL l17 Asa globalannihilation,literatureis
deceptive because everything contained in it is simuitaneousiydenied by itand its
contents cannot be cOllcretely grasped either; "literature, by ilsveryactivily,deniesthe
substance of what it represents. This is its law and its truth.,,1l8 Gcnerallyspeaking,the
worldmustundergoakindofdeathinamannersimilarandconnectedtothatofthe
author,bul on a granderscaie. According to I 'oeuvre, the world 0 fdetenninateactionand
possibility becomes distanced absolulely and the author is absorbed into the
impersonalityofsiience
But what is lhistotal deniai-theglobalnegation-that Bianchotascribestothe
activityofwrilingandwhichillegitimatesilsconlcm(s)?"[Thewriter's] negation is
global. .. Thisiswhynegationnegatesnothing,intheend,whythe work in which itis
realizedisnotatmlynegative,destructiveactoftransfonnalion, but rather the realization
of the inability to negate anything, the refusal to take part in theworld.,,119 Wriling
cannot negate anything in Ihe Hegelian sense because its total di stancing from the world
of the everyday means nothing is given and therefore nothing can be negated or even
constructed into a stable il11age. In the literary world of essential nothingness there is
nothingtonegatebecausetherearenoobjeclSlObegraspedandovercome.lnfact,what
matters is not that there is no real world.ore\·cn that there is this peculiar othcr world of
thelitcmrywor~butthatthereisnoworld)'e/becauseandoenotofTeritselftousa
stable or capable of being anticipated
The worldlessalteritythat litcmtureoccupies rclates to death inasmuchasbOlh
death and thc world of literature arc inactive and inefTcctual. In I 'oem're,thepoibility
foraclion exists no more. The possibility of an event requircsan instantiation in time and
wholly determinate objective qualities. but literature is experienced aspossibilily's
deficiency. Literature lacks possibility and fundamentally"literaturedoes not aCl.,·I20
Here, I believe. is another instance of the incommen urability ofSartre's commitment to
literature and Blanchot'srefusnl of it. In order to evidence the inefTectualityofan
inactiveconceptualizationof/'oetlvre,itwillbenecessarytoreconsider Hegel's thcory
ofdialecticalncgation
Ufe isa process of becoming and it retains the possibilityofactjng in terms of the
possibility of death. This process of becoming is indeed a struggle, but"ifyouslruggle
you are still alive: and everything thai brings the goal closer also rnakes the goal
inacces ible:,IlIThetimelessmomentofdeathexhaustsdeathasmankind'spossibility
and in it we lose the world and the capacity to act therein. Essentially, consciousness does
not overcome the moment of death and that is why it marks the indeterminable
transfomlation from the world of possibility to utter impossibility. As operative in the
I:MlLlleratlirelmdlhe Righi 10 Death. 58.
m L,teratlireo/ldlheRlgh,toDeath.56
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3.2. The Impossibili'y of Possibilily
IfldeorhllJepossibilityn'hichisdeolhdiesroo. J1J
The dealh al work in speech names things in their absence. It mcans naming 0nthebasis
of the thing-named's death
ThcreislhedeaththatislhehorizonofhumanJife,l-Iegel'sandHeidegger's
death as a possibility.121 Blanchofs literary death is the one essentiaJ to literature. This
other death is the death eludes understanding because it isullgraspabIe, inconceivable:
Thc Olherdeath-the double of death. the death belonging toa subjectless subject-is the
oneessentialtolitcralure.WhileJ-leidegger.aslwillshow.conceivesofdeathintemlsof
apcrsonalpossibility.accordingtoBlanchol'sanalysisl-leideggerJeaves this double of
dCalhunaccoumedfor.Additionally.aSlhedestruCLiveworkofnegation in Hegel
pertaios to the power of possibility, literary impossibility demands a new considerationof
dealh(andart).TheolhersideofdealhbelongslolheworklessimpersonalilyoflileralUre
or"theonethatweprefernottolhinkaboutpreciselybecauseiti unthinkable.nl29
In Section Two of Division One of Being and Time, Heidcgger explores Dasein'
rclation with death as an existential possibility. Dasein-being-there,being-in-the-world,
being for whom being is an issue-is the kind of being concerned with its own existence
intcmlsofilspotentialnon.existencc. 1JOAsl-leidcggerwrites.''dealhsignifie apeculiar
possibility-of-Being in which Ihc "cry Bcingofone'sQwn Dascin is an issue:,IJI The
possibility ofdeath as something impending and unavoidable is a possibility without a
flXeddelcrmination.ltisposiblebecauseitispossibleatanyinstant. 132
According to Heidegger, death is the moslsignificantofall thepossibilitiesof
Dasein's existence. lJ3 "Death," he states, his something that stands before us-something
impel1ding."ll4Therefore,lhis being that is characterized by being-towardsomething-
being-towards-death-is faced with the reality of their 1110S1 pcrsonalcondition;as
Derl11otMoranstates,"deathcunonlybeauthenticallycxpcricncedbyusifwebccol11c
tOlally secure with our first-person expericnccofdying urgenuineanlicipationof
dealh.WccannotexperienccOlherpeople'sdeathsinthesarneauthenticrnanner."ll5
Herede31h is described as a personal possibilily. a personally appropriated possibility.
andonc that is essentially and authentically mine.
The Being of Dasein is·'Being-lowards-death.',l36 Consequently. aulhenticbeing-
toward-death implies owning lhe mOSl significant possibility of humanexistcncc. l37
Death nOl be considered as an event, but an cx.pericnce; it ishaway lobe"as"Being-
towards-the-end:,1J8AsDasein'suttemlOstpossibility,"deathisin every case mine."1l9
It is a personalized possibility, which through aUlhenlic comportrnent toward it as the
Ullcnnostpossibililybecomesmine.mydcalh.Heideggerassens:"lloone confukelhe
Other's dying awayfrom him;' he means that no one can personally appropriate the death
of an other as his or herown. l40 One cannot die in the place of another. but is always
maintained in relation with death by Dasein'sstancc toward hisor her own personal end.
a death that is distinctly intimate and on my horizon
lnsllmmary,authenlicbeing-Ioward-dcalhiscndeavoringloachieveownership
overonc'sdeathintennsofitsanticipation.BlancholwilillotfolIowinthislineof
IhoughtbecauscforhimdeathrepresenlSanindetemlinacythatutterly eludes aUlhentic
comportment loward iL l41
Blanchot is not intcrestcd in Heideggerian Dasein per se. butratherwritingand
literature: while Dasein's own being is a question, writing is a question for writers. I..2 The
being-there of Dasein contrasts with "writing [as] withdrawal: the writer is no longer 'in
the world; but is withdrawn from it and from himself as correlative with it.,,14] The space
of literature is not the space of the rcal world; it is indifTerent to it and no one is ever
positivcly·there'initsvacuum:
To read the word death without negation is 10 withdraw from it the cutting
edge of decision and the powcrtonegl1te; it is to cut oneselfofTfrom
possibility and the true, but also from death as true event. It is to urrender
to the indistinct and the undetermined,to the emptiness anterior loevents,
where the end has all the heaviness ofsll:lning over. This experience is the
experienceofan. I.14
Since literature is dependent on impersonality (the form of no one in panicular),
Heidegger's lcnninologyof'authcntic' and 'inauthentic' is not filling."lfthere is,"says
Blanchot, "among all words, one thai is inauthentic, lhen surclyitistheword
·authcntic.·..14S Although both I-IcideggcrandBlanchotsccmtoagrceonthesignificancc
of an experience of death insleadofan eventofdeath,thcyclearly divergeonlhe
(irn)personalityoftheexperiencc.lfowever,themostsignificantdeparturefrom
Heidegger's analysis ofdeath as a phenomenon ofDasein-"lhepossibilityof
impossibi)ily"-istheaffinnationofdeathastheimpossibilityofpossibility.l46
Blanchot is clear in his difTerentiation from Heideggeron the certitudeofdeath.
I-Ie advises that we "do not count on death-on your own oron universal death-to found
anything whatsoever, even the reality of this death. Foritissouncertainandsounreal
that it always fades away ahead of time. and with it whateverdeclares it.,,147 Art's
uncertainty-an uncertainty it shares with death-is what makes art demand the reversal
ofthepossibilityofimpossibilitytotheimpossibilityofpossibility.Deathasan
impossibility isa condition of our mortality, not the source of our uttennostpossibility.
Impossibility is not a conscious moment, an activity undergone,buttherevocationofany
possibility for effective activity. Art,likedeath,mcanstheimpossibiliryofpossibility
because literaluredispossesses us and does not belong or adhere to theworld;l'oeuvre
and death are not useful instruments, but mark "the realization 0 ftheinabilitytonegate
anything.,,148
Although Blanchot figures literary death indetenninately,itneverthelessis
revelatory of something relev3nt to the humun (political)condi tion. 149 However, Ihe fact
thathcviewslileratureandl'oeuvreasrevelaloryatallispeCliliar1y ambiguous because
"literature seems to be allied with the strangeness of that existence which being has
rejected and which does nor fit into any category."lS0 If the artist doesnotsllrrenderovcr
to it, then I'oellvre will neveraffinn itself:
from all fonns of possibility-how does this come about? How, ifhe is
ahogetherpossibility, can man allow himself anything resemblingan?ISI
Ifan were classified as just another mundanely possible thing--or in the case of
I-Ieidegger,asthemostsignificanthumanpossibility-then/'oellvrewould be reduced to
another of mankind's technical powers. But since an is so closely implicated with death,
it cannot be integraled into the network of means and powerdistribulion because it is
essenliallyungraspableandunlhinkable.Thusthequestionofanstaysopen.Onedoes
nOl bring about the realizalion ofliteraturc's space anymore lhanonecaninstigalca
mystical experience; sllch experiences are characterized by thei r inability to be
legitimately pursued. Just as Blanchot says we are neverconsciousofdeath,neithercan
lhe anist achieve I 'oeuvre by way of conscious intentionality.This has the implication of
an never being at the anist·s disposal; rather, it is something one 11111stbereceplivetoin
thefonnofvigilance. 152
According to Blanchol,possibilityand knowledge arc too closely associated
Technologyanditsnewl11odesofcOllll11UnicationhavCllladeiLbethatthetotalityofan
can be brought fonhat thecolllmand of an individual (e.g. online encyclopedias)
Blanchot was already keen lOlhis issue when Friend'ihip(L'Amitie,1957)waspublished,
wherein he refers to lechnology'sability to 'generously'offerinfonnalion
instantaneouslyuponcol11mandaslheestablishrnenlOfan'il11aginaryl11useum.'ISJ
Technology directs us lOward that which is possible in tennsofknowledge,bull'oeuvre
and its (sclf) affinnation confronts us with the impossible. which must be somcthing
either more primordial than knowledge or its dissolution.
The capacity for literature to be self-detenniningand paradoxical issomething
considercd by the poeny in The Impossible. II speaks:
How does one join with the void? Rather. how does the void reach out and tollch you?
Theansweristheexperienceofanandthccxperienceofanasimpossibilityand
language. where"languagecan neither free itself from things nor becomeathing;itis
drawn simultaneously in two opposing directions.,·155 II is not a human capacity, power,
possibility, or object of personally approprialcd knowledge. Therefore.neithcrdealhnor
artcanbchllm811izedinthisway.IS6Thcwritersllbl11ilstolanguage,whichisncver
uscfultysubordinaledlohimorher
Literature and literary death arc not pure abstractions. Certainlythereissomc
material given (e.g. the book) from which an can thcn manifest and self-detemlinc. If
"Iiteraturc seems 10 be allied with the strangeness of that existencewruch being has
rejccled and wbjch does not fil inlo any category:' then what isthebook?U7 ForBlanchot
ilisakindofcorpse,whichisanolhcrwayheconceivesoftheencounterwiththedealh
that cannot bethought, thal is. lheollrer. lilerarydeath.
Evidenced in I-Ieidegger'sauention 10 death inBeingandTimeisak indofdeath
Ihalisnolmine.Thisisthedeathoftheother.whichforl-lcideggeris: "Being-just-
present-al-hand-and-no-more.,,158 Sucha being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-morewould
perhaps bc a corpse. for example, but Heideggertreatslhecorpseasanobjectfor
knowledgcloovercorne.Hewrites."cventhecorpsewhichispresent-at-hand is still a
possible object forlhestudentofpmhological anatomy. whose understandingtends 10 be
oriented to the ideaoflife:,159 For Blanchot, the corpse delivers a materiallypronounced
death,akindofexistencedetachedfrombcinglikelhcrealityofwordsandanimaginary
slOry. Dascin is irrelevant when one finds oneself encountering samethingthatrefuleslhc
capacity tobc interiorized-lheencollllierwhich refuses m· and this istheencollnlcr
with the image. Asl will show, Blanchot'scadavcr is highlysigni ficantforoutliningthc
rolcofthc image and the word in litcralure,and it highlights lhc importanceofdeathfor
his conceptualizalion of art.
Uteratllreislangllagetumingimoambigllity.l60
If a poem can be said to have a meaning. then the poem'5 meaning is its very way
ofexisting. 161 The meaningof1he poem i n01mcaninginthesenseofHeidegger"s
happcningoftruth,butisundetcnnined.Whilegencrallythereisfirsttheobjecland1hen
theimage,whichisakindofidealizationoftheobjecl,poeticlanguage does not mean an
idealizcdobjccl. 162 Blancho1affinns that there are at least two ways inwhich 10 conceive
of the image. Inlhe first place there is the image as I have just stated: fi rsttheobjec1,then
its idealization by the object's negation. However, foranistic imageryandthelanguage
Ofpoe1ry, Blancho1 describes the image as"thc thing as distance:' ratherthanbeing
apprehended at a distance, and"prcscnt in its absence, grnspable beeauseungrnspable.
appearing as disappeared."163 The illlage as the voided presencc of purcabsenceis Ihat
whichl'oelivrecvokesandthehol11citlllukcslbritselfinlanguage
LiLCrary language does not grant that which itn3111csan idealexislcnee or life in
thcl11ind. bUI ralher it names an exiSlcnce (a thing) without being;Uitpoimsloan
existence that precedes the ideal existence of language. reaffinningitselfasthcrcserve
with which languagecannothavedone.·· I64 Blanchot affinns'existence'asreprcsen1a1ive
of1hematerialwordonthepageandthebook.Theinkandpaperhavecxis1ence.but
bchind the word is nothing; it resembles nothing. This resembling-nothing relates 10
/'oe",·re·s meaningless thrust, a kind of existence without being, an ungraspable
impossibility. The encounter with the book is akin to the encounter with thecorpse
becauscmonalremainsareanencounterwithexistencewithoutbeing.
The type of imagery Blanchotdescribes as belonging to litcrarylanguage is
defined by resemblance. For Blanchot, resemblance is an immanent way of meaning. "A
beingwhosuddenlybeginsto'resemble'."81anchotwr11cs:
Since Blanchot sees a correlation betwecn an encounter with the dcceased andlitemry
language, his notion of imagery is aptly namedcadavcrous imagery, which is the
apparatusofexistencewithoutbcing.
Thccffcctofdealhon the living body makcsthclllortal rClllains;"death
lransfonns Ihe body intosolllcthingwhich,likean illlage,isonlya rcsemblancc.,,166 This
corpse docs not establish a relation among meanings; rather the corpse's meaning is
"meaning whose potential infinity is immediately present in its very void.',167 111ccorpse
is not a relation between the former host and the body-a relation which has now become
meaningJess-because the person (the former host) is totaJ1y absen1. This is why the
corpsc'resembles: rather than 'renects:"Resemblance is not a meansofimitatinglife
butofmakingitinaccessible,ofestablihingitinadouble[thecorpse] that ispennanent
and escapes from life. Living figures, men. are without resemblance..•I68
Corpscs and their relation to imagery insist on Ihe meaninglessness thatBlanchot
attributes to literature's dClachmcnt of images from objects in the world." otonlyisthe
image of an object not the sense of this object, and nOI only is itof no avail in
understanding the object. it tends to withdraw the object from understanding by
maintaining it in the imrnobilityofa resembJance which hasnothingtoresemble..·I69
Blanchot conceives of something thai has nothing 10 rescmble as emanatingstrangeness.
This strangeness is the status of the corpse presenting a simultancousunionofpresence
andnbsence. Thcdeceascd isgon absent-but yet this bociyoftheirs is indeed given.
Blanchotwrites,"thedeceased,il issaid,isnolongcrofthis world; he has lefi it behind.
BUlbchindlhereis,precisely,thiscadavcr,whichisnOloftheworld either, even though
il is hcrc.,· l7oThe corpse is the presence of an ungraspable nothi ngness because I can no
longertcll to whom Ihis corpse rclalcs. The corpse surelycannol be lhefonnerhost,who
has died and isno longerpresenl in lenllS ofa malerial body. Through Ihis unity of
presence and absence in the mon.al remains, I confrontworldlcssness insomelhing
Ina manner befitting the confrontation with a corpse, literature is itseIf the
manifestation of strangeness. The kind oflanguageencounlcred must bedisplacingand
similar 10 nOlhing in order to be unerly unfamiliar. The image and Ihecorpseareboth
very strange, presenting this existence withoU1 being as unknown and unknowable. his
thus 1hrough the cadaverous image that I'oelll're'sworldiessnessseizesus."Death
suspends the rela1ion to place,"and,"the cadaverous presence estabIishesarelation
betwecnhcreandnowhere."I1IThcreforc,thecorpse.like/'oellvre,removesus from the
world wherein action is possible and delivers ustoan unknowableunknown:thevoidof
Iitcrature·sspace.Forexample,lhebook l72 precedes/'oell\'reandthelivingperson
precedes the corpse. but through death-a death understood as the impossibility of
possibility or orlter death-the book transfonns into/'Dem'reandthecorpse respectively.
Litcrnrydeathand its cadaverous resemblance is figured as"lhedeath that isthe non-
dialecticalollteroflivingexistence."I73 Thecorpsercfusesitselfto being gmsped;its
affimla1ion isa refusal ofappropria1ion. This orhermanifest3tion,which is devoid of
form, cmphasizes the importance of death in the li1crarycxperience, wheredeaLhis
spoken by literary speech,
LitcraryspccchmakcsuseorakindormcthodotogicalnoLhingnessby requiring
1he writer 10 pronounce death Lhroughwriting.Thepronouncementistheabsenceorwhat
is named. itsno1hingness, its death. AILhough language does not ki II (as ina homicide for
example),itannouncestheoccurrenceofa 'real'death,174 As Blanchotexplains
This is the destructive capacity inherent in language that announces death as a function of
communication and without which Blanchot says communication would not even
function on the level of the everyday. However. litcrnryspeech is not merely idealized
abstraction, negation. and a real death; ilgoes funherthan naming in terms of ordinary
communication."The literary parole [specch] annihilatcs the object thatitnamesand
represenlsit absence in the form of an idea," where absence itselfisthe idea. 176
Basicnlly, language. including liternry language, announces death withoulmurder.A
presence exposed to nothingness byn word marks dcath's violenlanddestructiveliterary
lunguage be solely proclaimed, bUI more·so lhut the womun-'this woman'-aclunlly
possess Ihe possibility fora real death becausc"ifthis woman were nOl really capable of
dying, ifshe were not threatened bydcuth at every momenlofhcrlifc, bound andjoined
to death by an essential bond. I would not be nblc to carry out that ideaI negation, that
deferred assassination which is what my language is.''I77 The capacity for real death in
language constitutcs the implicit linguistic model underlying BIanchot'sgeneral
comments on literature. Language might not murder. but it calls upon the fundamenml
featureofitsrcfercllt: the capacity to die or be killed. It is this underlyingimportanccof
death thaI refers to the life of speech, but in literature absence cannotbc'killed,'so
literary speech is negation with nothing more to negate
L'oeuvre is littered with linguistic corpses, all of which signifynothillg but this
formlesspresenceofabsenceandlheessentialsilenceandnolhingnessofliterature,
Literary speech speaks death. Languagc'sexpressionofdeathaslhe hope of language-
"fhe liJe that endures death andmainfail1s itselJin it"-meansthat language is in
proximity to the impossibility of dying and illuminating existeneewithoutbeing. 178
Therefore, death can be defined as "exislence withollt being,exislcncewhichremains
below existence, like an inexorable affinnation, without beginningorend-deathasthe
impossibility ofdying.,,179 This death in the lilerary or other sense excmplifieswhatthe
literary word accomplishes: naming death as existence deprived of being
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Death. Although revolution may be generally linked with revolut ionaryaction, it is an
action ofa difTerent sort and unproductive in kind. As I will show, revolutionaryactionis
like the impossibility of literature and the commonalities between the two include
interruptivequestioning,death,andfreedom.
offering of an other world, alien and utterly strange-it must deny the world of existence
by way ofthegloball1egatiol1 so as to create the fictitious and imaginaryone;wrilingis
witltdrawalfromtheworld.lfliteratureservespoliticalends,notonlyis it no longer
lilerature in the Blanchotian sense, but it is also inhcrentlydenyinglhepoliticaliment
supposedly written into it (delegitimatizing itsell);"the runction that he assigns to
literature is therefore, profoundly anticullural.,,187 Basically Ii teraturemakespolitical
action, and all action forthatmalter,inefTcclual because Iiteralureisitselfinactively
impersonal; the only relation litcraturenndpolilics sharc is,seemingly, indirect
Blanchot says that literature is ineffectual and that ildoes not act; hence its
impossibility.Accordingly,itcannotbeapoliticalinstrumcnt;literaturecannotbc
confused ormisrecognizedasa political pamphlct ora work ofintentionalpartisan
rhctoric. Iflitcrature is never a political tool,thenservingaparty'sagenda-likeSartrean
ellgagedliteralllre,forexample-canhave no political significance atall because
literature inherently denies everything it contains and makes it inoperativelyillegitimate.
"People who are in favor of action reject literature, which does not act, and those in
search of passion become writers so as not to act."lll8 But then how is revolution related
to literature? The answer provided concems the essence of literatureitself:literature
becoming a question for literature
Questioning casts aside certitude and opens lip a space for the new and
undetennined. The space of questioning, like the space of literature,isoneofunbollnded
denial,denial of the current Illilieu. The movement of questioning is interruptive and
dispossessing. Literature interrupts the everyday comlllonality and banality of work and
labor in the world for sOlllething new; it puts everything intoquestion.Asaninterrllption,
literatureismarkedbyunforeseeableandundeterminedconsequences becallse there is no
clear goal on the horizon.
Revolution a!so operates according to the lllovelllcnlofqucstioning as essentially
interruptive. Blanchotdefines revolution as thc 1ll0lllcnt or event whereeverything
scnse, "freedom aspires to be realized in the immediate fonn ofevelytltil1g is possible,
evcrythingcan bedone.,,189 Writers are drawn to such a Illoment beeauscinorderfor
writingtobesliccessful,meaningforl'oeuvretoovcrtakeandovercome the book,a
strange and imaginary world must be accessed by theglobalnegatiol1 attributed to
writing itselfand the necessity of its creativity orworldlessness.1tisonlyinanimaginary
world lhat everything remains to be done because such a world representsabsolute
frecdom."Revolutionaryactionisinevcryrespectanalogousta action as embodied in
IggUreral"rcalldlheRighI roDcalh. 33
Ig\lUrerall/realldlhe RighI to Dealh. 38
literature: the passage from nothing to everything. theaffinnation of the absoluteas evenl
andofeveryeventasabsolute:· '90 lnrevolutionarymomenlS.whichput everything into
question.everythingfamiliar-onccputintoqucslion-becomesthevoidof
nothingness-thespaceofliteralU wherein the only realizable goal is freedom
Throughfreedomeverythingpriortotherevolutionreducestorubble:"people
cease to be individuals working at specific laSks. acting herc and only now: each person
is universal freedom, and universal freedom knows nothing about elsewhere or
tomorrow, or work or a work accomplished:,'91 The revolution does away with the
current cultural milieu and in it"death as an event no longer has any imponance;"adeath
lacking importance is an impersonal dealh. '9l As Blanchotexplains,··inorder 10 wrile.he
[the writer] must destroy language in itspresenlfonnandcreateitinanotherfonn.'·19J
The writer must commitlhe global negation and pronounce death-the existence without
being-in literary speech; he or she 11111St cngagein revolution's literarycontemplation'
Blanchotdescribes Robespierrcasdcsiringdcath. 195 For Robespierre.death no longer
constitutcsameaningfulorirnponantevent.
The writer is drawn to revolution by whal it represenlS.··The writer sees himsel f
in the Re\olution. It anracts him because il is Ihc time during which litcraturebecomes
history," and therefore death as an e\'cnl no longer has any imponance. l96 Due in p3rtto
thcmeaningless immancnceofpoelic words. wrilingand revolution withdraw 10\\"ardthal
limit of impossibility; like death and poelic words, rcvolulioncontcmplatesunavailable
possibilitics.··Poetry."accordingto Bataillc's The Impossible, "is not a kl1oU'ledge oj
oneself and el'en less the experience 0/0 remote possible (of that which, before. was not)
blitratherthesimpleel'OcotionthrollghU'orc/so/i"accessiblepossibilities..•197 This
'simpleevocation'isthefreedornofrevolution,whichismanifestedbydealhduringlhe
Reign of Terror, wherein no one possesses lheir right to life any Ianger
According to Blanchot,"evcrycitizcnhusurighttodeath,sotospeak: death is
notascntenccpassedonhim,itishismostcsscntialright;hcisnat suppressed asa guilty
person-he needs death so that he can proclaim himsclfacitizen and itisinthe
disappearance of death that freedomcauscs him to be born.',198 Thedisappearanceof
dcath-disappearance in termsofdcath as a meaningful event. an event 0 fany
importance-mcansa death that is no longcrundcTStood intcnnsofdying.negation,or
work. The disappearance of death in bolh revolution and Iiteratureimpliesabsolute
freedom. a freedom altributed to the binhofthe Reign ofTerror, revolutioningeneral.
andliterature. l 9'9
revolutionaryfreedom.likethefreedomof/·oem're,lackscxpectations. BUl thewrilcr is
not withoutasenseofresponsibility:"to writc freely is also lO take responsibilityfor
whntfrecdomisnot;itislobraceoneselfagainstlheconditionsofsociety,toOnsh
agninstthednrknessofourpresentcondition-toflash.and.inthisOashing,toexpose
the cracks and the interstices, the great contradictions in lheprcsentstaleofsociety.'JOO
Freedom means exposure and a lack of commitment to the currenl societal nonn;
"freedom is nothing ifitis not the freedom to livcattheedgeoflimitswhcreall
comprehensionbreaksdown.,·201 This push toward unboundedness orcatastrophcto
inhabitthccdgcofthcultirnatclimit(Lc.dcath)islikcthchabitationofablackholc's
event horizon: impossible.
Slogans of the French Revolution included ""libcny. equality. fraternily.ordcnth."
bUlBlanchotimrnediatelyreducesthispanicularslogantofrccdom or death. which thus
mnkes the relatedness of revolution to literaturc morc evident.102 Theconjunctionof
libcrty,equality,andfratemitycouldbcinterpretedasthereductionofparticularpersons
en masse to an impersonal community.20J A notion of community, for which Blanchot
hasauniqueconceprualization, is importantly linked to the reading of literature.where
the existence of/'oeuvre is derived from the community of readers.
10J Llterattlrc amI the Right to Dl.'lIIh. 38.
ByexploringLhesignificanceofreadingliteraturewecanbenersituatethe
imponanceofdesoem'remenrforpoliticalrelationsinBlanchot'swritings.ltisnot
enough Lhat Lhebook iswriuen; it must disappear for/'oem'retoappearasLhis
disappearance. The narrative must bcallowed toaffinn itselfand this is accomplished
through rcading, but not just any reading. Hence. Blanchotmakesaclear distinction
bctween reading literature (or fiction) and reading nonfiction. Reading is never merely
reading 'in general.'
4.1. Reading
Readil1ga.fide.fheqllesfiol1o/readil1gisol1lymoreessemia(!Os
Blanchol conceives of the writing experience as a kind ofsufTering andLhe
enduranceofimpossibility;havingwrinenandthusbecome'anist'isaspecial
accomplishment.106 Reading is imponant becausc"Lhe fact is thal oLherpeopIe do not
wanl to hear their own voices:,207 People read because there is somethingolTeredas
unforeseeable,unfamiliar;byreadingthenarrativeispasivelygrantedits opportunity for
accomplishment or self-unfolding.
Assuming that he is addressing a fully litcratcaudicnce (since hismediumis
writing itsclf), Blanchotdescribesrcadingasthemoslbasiccreativecapacityofallthe
arts (aural and ocular incJusivc)."Reading requires no gifis at all andshowsthis appcalto
anaturaldistinclionforwhatilis:-lO'l o opportunity is given by literarure foreithcrthe
wrileror the readcr to ever be in a position of power; both are un-gifted orgifiless.This
typeofgifiless (or perhaps talenlless) reading is not just any readingexpericnccin
general, but is specific 10 litemture.
Blanchot considcrs the sceingofa painting and the hcaringofapieceofmusicto
require a gifi or key. These gifis 3re actually abilities restricled to closed spaces. like
gallcricsorCOl1cert halls; they also implytnlent.2W Theproblem Iitcraturcposesfora
comparison witholherarts lies in I'oellvre'scsscncc. whichcompIctclyconvolutcs.
rcvcrses. and problemalizes such a comparison via its unity of contradictorymovcmcnts
At Lhecenterofliteratureisno1jusLthcconLradictorymovcmentofvisibilityand
invisibility, meaning the play of written words and imagery. but also absenceandabscncc
as presence (e.g. the corpse that is present. but dclivcrs the absence of the personas its
presence). dissolution and illumination.2lOTheseliterary revelations do not allow fora
'talented'approachtowardthem because a tllient cannot bean aptitude fora
contradictory movement; a talent is possible and I'oem're is not,
In order for Blanchot to develop a notion of readinglhat isappropriateforthe
talu of literature and the condilions of/'oem're, rcading must heed to the 0 pennessof
literature's question, According to this impotenliality, rcading is passivity in the fonnof
unconcem,21l Readingcannotconversewith/'oem're.itcannotakquestions of it. and it
must allow I'Dem're the freedom to be and nothing more (i.e, no personal impositions
beyondpassiveunconcem).Therefore,readingisessentialfor/'oem're'scommunication,
where communication is not conversation or infonnation. but/'oem're "communicating
itselfin the becoming that is unique to it.,,212
Blanchotdifferentiates between two kinds of reading with the intcntofshowing
howonlyaparticularmodeofreadingissuitablefor!'oellvre'sunfoiding,2U Wh ileon
the side of pure art lhere is fiction and reading in lhelilcrarymodc,ontheother,thcreis
nonfiction and reading in thenonlilcrary l11ode, Nonficlion is never to be confused with
/'oeuvrebecause it employs languagedifTercntlYl meaning it adheres to and makcs use of
nctworksofsignification. '"Only the nonliterary book is presented asa tightly woven net
ofdetennined significations. a set of real affinnations, Before being readbyanyone,the
nonliterary book has already been read byall,and it is this priorreadingthatguaranteesit
a solid exislence.,,214 Due to the nonliterary book's concretized signification and the
knowledge it contains-a knowledge that is objective, factual, and familiar or worldly-
everyone has already read Ilonliterarybooks. These books are wri tten with understanding
and comprehension as the intentional aim of the elltirc textual expericnce, author and
reader included. The epistemological status of the varietyoffacts offered by reading a
Ilonliteraryworkissuchthatthcaffinnationsalwayscorrespondwiththerealplaneand
often require little imagination on the behalfofthereader. All that the nonliterary book
commullicates preceded the production of the book; its truth issl illthatoftheworld,not
its dissolution. However, Blanchot is adamant that literarytruthisnon-trulh. 2IS
Nonfiction delivers itselfasakindofguaranteelhrough itscorrespondingsystem
of truth. Readingnonliterarybooksisaconversationwithvarious affirmatiolls about the
realworld,wherethereader'srenectionuponthcseatlinnalionsimposesitselfandfixes
the reader ill the world. Likework,nonfictioll actively participateswith thcworld and
through this correspondence, nonliterary reading establishes a guarantee of the world and
itsexistence;thereisnothreatoftheimaginary.J-1owever,"thcbook which has its origin
in art has no guarantee in theworld,and when it is read,it has neverbeenreadbcfore.lt
does nolcome into its presenceasa work except in Ihe space openedupbythisunique
reading, each time the first and each timeonly.,,216 Literary read ing, which is always a
firstreading,willmanifest/'oellvreasstrangeandlinfamiliar.Literaryreadingdeniesthe
submit to, does not brace itselfupon anything already present."217
Write to say nothing. 218
According lo Blanchol,literary reading is neverinterpretalion,comprehension,or
evenconversalion with atexl. Reading literature is always readingforthelirsttime,
which mcans that ignorance or forgetfulness is favorablebecauseiglloranceislhe
condilionofalirstencollnter.lndistinctiontoreadingnonfiction, which calls upon the
reader's familiarity with the real world offacts-mealling that lhebookisavehicleof
knowledge and that lhe readerisa being-in-the-world-reading Ii teraturerequireslhat
the world beabandoned,dismissed.2 19 Blanchotaffinllsthat this killd of reading cannot
even belong to the same plane as understanding220 because while comprehension favors
memory and understanding, literary reading necessitates ignoranceandforgetfulness.221
This illiteracy of the real. in tum, allows an tobcdescribcd by Blanchotasindetemlinate
L'oem'reofTers itselfas unknown and neverpredetermincd. that is itsessence.Authors
writing with a particular public in mind. like Sanre for example. are not delivering what
Lhe rcaderdcsires in reading: a rcal book and an imagin3TY story,21J These are thecriteria
forafascinatedencounLerwith/'oem're.whcrefascinaLionispassion for the realm of
literature in the form of passive consent. 224 Reading in the literary IIIodeisitselfakindof
adherence to 3rtislic unboundedness. manifcstcd by the illlaginory's evocation and the
spaceoflitcraturc'sopcning,"Solllcthing is there which the book prescntsinpresenting
itselfand which readinganilllotcs. which rcadingreeslablishcs-throughilsanimation-
inthelifeofapresence.'·225 nlis'anil11otion,'thcspaceoflilerature,is,forBlonchot,a
no-place, devoid of time. fixed reality. or being-in-the-world-anoutside226-andso
reading must affirm this placeless placc whercin death as impossibility is encountered
Literature is not deliberate obfuscation, but imaginary; itis flct ion. 227 The
imaginary is the condition for the improbable or unthinkable, which allows literary
reading to unfold a space of nothing, devoid of meaningful conten t.L'oeuvreimpliesthe
absence of the book; it requires it. However, the book is notobsolete. uThe book
constitutestheconditionforcverypossibilityofreading.,,228So, the book must precede
!'oellvre, but there is only the achicvcmcnt of pure art whcre the book has withdrawn
This absence is a withdrawal from the worldly plancofcol11prehensiOl1 or renection and
the familiarity of real factual knowledge. Since !'oeuvre never precedesthebook,the
enclosed in it, not so l11uch its exterior as a reference toan outsidethatdoesnotconcem
thebook.,,229Thisspace,whichisakindof'outside,' is the space of literature
Sincewecannotknowdeterminatelywhatartis,writcrandrcadcrrcl11ain
ignorant and forgetful
Blanchotdescribesreading'sesentialforgetfulncs intwoway.First.areadermustbe
ignorantofan'sexistence.Second.forgetfulnessmeansforgettingtheworldofthereal
cxists. a worldly amncsia that allows forthc eruption of an in thcstrange void spacc
whereinitself-subsislS."Eachencounterwiththeworkisncwinthesenscthatitbrings
about a singularopcningofan inexhaustible reserve," meaning theworkless rcserve of
the imaginary (I will retum to this point ina latersection).231 Forgetfulness and ignorance
maybeconceivedintcnnsofwaywarddesire;··lthinkthcwritcrdcsiresnothing:'writcs
Blanchot.lnThe reader's desire must also be nothing ifnothing is lhe imaginary alien
world of the anwork. Forgetfulncss is the gift of impossibility. Jmpossibility belongs to
/'oeUl'reandthereadermustconcedctoliteraturc'simpossibility.toits·impossiblc
projCCl.,HJ
Reading is freedom; thc"frccdom that wclcomcs, consents, saysyes, can only say
yes, and in the space opcncd by this yes, IClsthcwork'soverwhelmingdecisivcness
artinn itself,lets be its affinllation that it is-and llothillgmore.,,234 Freedom in the form
ofaycs-reading in the literary mode-is also freedom in the scnse ofimpotentiality.
openncss.Thisspaceisnotaimedat.norseizcd;itiswhatremainsfrom a profound
unconcern and laborless ignorance conditioncd by the alien worldofthestory.
Readinginvolvesauniqueencounter.ltspa5siveyesofunconcernoccursin
conjunction with l'oeUl're's refusal ofcultuml dClennimnions. Literature belongs to no
age exclusively, it is limeless. "Our impression lhalworks are age less expresses, by
forgetting it, what makes the work always accede to presence forthe first time in its
reading-its unique reading, each time the firsl and each timeonly.,,2JSHeretheignorant
first-reading of literature is the confirmation ofl'oeuvre's unbounded and unrestrictcd
essence, one lhat is affinned by the unconcem of reading's freedom . The essential
freedomofreadinginlheformofa'yes,'meanstheaffirmationofanunforeseeable,
inevitable,anduniquerevelation.236
Blanchot plays with this threatening communicalion of/'oeuvreinhisbook
Thomas fhe Obscure (Thomas L 'Obscure, 1941), which is considered a riicif [tale or
narrative].2J7 OeofTrey Hartman describes this book'ssubjectasbeing art and
consciolisness;"Thomas is fighting, like the writcr, with consciOllsness itself."2J8 In The
SpaceojLiferorure,Blanchotindicatcslhatlhcreaderisalsoimplicatcdinastruggle:
This zone ofcxcess is thc lInbounded and indetenninate spaceofart,aspaceof
nothingness wilholitcontenL To read is tobe fascinated by an immobilizing fixation on
art'svoid,meaningthespaceofliterature.
The reader'sslaleofnon-imposilionorunconcemis similar to a positionof
waiting to be devoured as described in the founh chapler of n,omas the Obscure. where
we find Thomas reading:
This glance islhe forgetfulness lhal o\'crcomes and ovenakes lhe reader. who is always
anonymous.2.. 1 Just as the female praying mantis devours the male after an intimate
encounter, so does lhebook in a certain sense devour lhe reader's personality or worldly
componment.Literatureisalwaysimpersonal.devoidofpersonality.AsBlanchot's
narratordescribes,"it was a story emptied ofevenls, emptied lo the poim that every
memory and all perspective were eliminated, and nevertheless drawing from lhis absence
its inOcxibledircclion which scemcd lo carry everything away intheirresisliblc
movemenlloward an imminent catastrophe," meaning to the point where conventional
lhoughlSand personality no longerapply.242 This is the threat posed tolhe reader. who
freely and willingly accepts it
Thomas continues lO be gripped by reading's hold:
solitude ... It was a modulation of that which did not exist, a different
mode of being absent, another void in which he was coming to life. 243
Reading is non-productive freedom. It makes the book disappear andthllsgiveslifetothe
void: "reading simply 'makes' the book, the work, become a work beyond the man who
produced it, the experience Ihat is expressed in it and even beyondalltheartistic
resourceswhichtraditionhasmadeavailable ... ltisfrcedOln."244 Reading, Ihrough its
consensllal unconcern,allowslhebook to become a work of art. Neithcrthelangllage
dcployed by I'oeuvre nor the reading itselfsllbordinatcsart fro m its protected immanent
cxistcncc; lilcrary langllage is its own and "whoever asserts literature in itself assert's
nothing.,,245
Freedom,theconscntingyes to thepowerof/'oellvre, relatcsa 1I niquepowcrto
impossibility. This relation hasthrec modes: the reader makes the book into an artwork
beyond the aUlhor, beyond experience or work,and beyond any arti sticresourccs.246 The
significanceoflhcsethreecriteriafor/'oeuvre'scxistenceis lhatlhey permit literature to
remain unsubordinated to human productivity
Artistic freedom ismovemcl1t: "ilis freemovement,ifit is not SUbjeclto
anything, ifitdoes nOldepcnd on anything already present.,,247 Movement,asitappears
in Blanchol'swritings, designates something that cludcsconceprual understanding; it is
"a common name for what most deeply resists systematic, scientific explication.,,2.a8
Literature is never tatic: ,·the work of an isneverconneeted to repose. it has noLhingto
do with the tranquil certitude which makes masterpieces familiar: it does not take shelter
in museums:.2.a9 The idea of the impossibilityofrcst is paramount forunderstanding
movement's essence because it is what finally does awaywilh the subjeet-objeel
distinction.··· ubjects'and'objects'takeupposilionsintheworld-theyareposedand
therefore capable of repose" and so if reading docs not confonn lorealiIy's fixity. then it
can have no such binarydistinclion.250
4.3.0reamingandReading
What are we to make of all the singular expcrience of reading posed by
Blanchot'snccountofreadingliterature,cspccirdlysinccitisso important for his notion
of'thc absence of the book'? Whcreis the political in all of this? Before I can answer the
laucrqucstion, I mustaddresslhe first. Myeffortsalexplaining BIanchot's account of
reading lead mc to fonnulatethe followingworkingdefinitionofreading:itisafreeand
unconcerned movement wherein "oelll're comes to subsist. like life given to tbe void. by
way of the unreality of the imaginary. fascination, and an anonymous reader. Described
in this way. I think it is appropriate to \iew Blanchot'sdepictionofreadingas a kind of
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dreaming, since dreaming is itself another way of conceiving of hisnondialectical
Illovement. Reading's and dreaming's movement is the movement offreedolllat play in
impolentiality. Although Blancholis interested in something rathcrrcmolefromSartrean
cOlllminedliterature, 1have chosen Sartre's account of dreaming from ThelmagiflGf)J
(1940) as a cOlllpanion study to elucidate the way in which reading and dreaming can be
viewed as synonymous experiences,252 I will develop this position in the following with
the intcnt of showing how dreaming and rcadingcmphasizedesoeuvreme11l,whichisthc
hcartofBlanchot's notion of community and wherein thepoliticaI rclationwith rcading
There is l101hingmagical about literature. In order to gain accesstoliterature's
rcalization we do not need to be tuned-in to special mystic powers. Although reading
could be confused witha myslical cncounlcrwherein an otherly rcalm (the outside) is
Illanifestcd giving the readersollle privileged access to it, Ihis issimplynotBlanchot's
view. The encounter with theoulside is not adivinerevelation, but something much more
simple and mundane. Reading.ifitis like anything, is likedreamingbecause bOlh are
ineffectual,unreOeClive.and narrative based. The dream and l'oeilvrearesimilarinlhat
"il[eilherthedreamor/'oeuvre] is always lacking in relation to the conditions of actual
exislence:being,butimpossible.,,25J
For Sartre, dreams belong to the realm of the imaginary. Dreams employ
il1lagination,which,tousehistenninology.isanunreflectiveoril1laging consciousness.
understanding and comprehension. Understanding, which implies going beyond oneself,
belongsloreflectiveconsciousness.254 Therefore,unre(lectiveconsciousness-the
imagination-is closed to the utterance I am dreaming. I am dreaming is an assertion
belonging to consciousness in a renectivc l1lode.
In The ImaginOlY. Sartre stales that "every dream image appears with its own
world.,,255 Drcam images are not related 10 each olherorto olher images,suchaslhose
given by perception; they are not Ihe same as I11cntal il11ages. The typeofil1lagery
involved in dreal11ingis uniquely imaginary in kind. Thcrefore,everything must be
tranSf0n11ed into the il11aginary, which is nol real. bUI irreal
Thcdreal11 form is irreal: "thedrcal11 isaprivilcgcdcxpcricnccthatcan help us to
conceive what aconsciotlsness would be like that had lost its 'being-in-the-world'and
had,at the same til11e, been deprived of the category of the real.,,256Theirreal is lacking
inbothtemporalandspatialdeten11inatiotls.ltthusbelongstoanimaginaryworld,a
worldwhollydifTerent from the perceptual worldofwakefulness.Theimaginaryworld
requires impersonality (efTaccmem ofthcdreal11cr); as Sartre states,"theil11aginaryworld
iscnlirelyisolated,lcanenteritonlybyirrealizingl11yself.,,257 Therefore, when one
passes from the wakeful slate tOlhe dream world. everything is transfonned intothe
im:lginary,nnd the vantage point of the dream isthedeni:ll oftheobjectworld-a
nihilation-from a panicular point of view, meaning that of the dreamer: "suddenly
introduce a real person imothcdrcamand the dream completely falls apart.,.25S
WhodreamsthedreaI1l1hcn?ThedrcamlransfonnsallintoLheimaginary.1Icnce
consciousncss' deprivation of being· in-the-world. TemenugaTrifonova states that. for
3rtre,dreamsareimpersonalconsciousnesses:"dreamsandhallucinationsnihilatethe
subject-object distinction, replacing it with an impersonal spontaneityoranimpersonal
consciousness:.lS9 Furthennore, artre'simpersonaldreamer,whoseconsciousnessisin
an unreflective mode, is consistent with his early work in The Transcelldenceofrhe£go
(1937),whereinheasserts,"thereisnolontheunreflcctedlcvel.'.260 Unreflective
consciollsncss is the levelofimpcrsorml life.
Sartre'sphenomenologicalpsychologyoftheimuginalionfromThelmagil101Y
heipsestabiishthereiatednessoftwobasicimagin8tiveevcIlts:readinganddreaming
Neithcrthedreamnorreadingisanapprehensionofrcality;"itis above all asto/J1and
we take thc kind of passionate interest in it that the naYve reader takeswhenreadinga
novel:,261 I am mindful of the following fmgment on dreaming as a preliminary
foundation for developing a theory of rcading as a kind of dreaming:
Where I am dreaming, something wakes. a vigilance which is the
unexpectedness of the drcam and where in faci there keeps watch. ina
While I cannot grasp oresrablish myselrin the dream, this isexactlywhy sleep is or
imponance:'·insleep,thesleepercollcctshimorherselr.rorthesake oCthe enterprises or
Iheday into a single position, a resling place in which he or she is a grounded and
grounding subject. at home in Iheworld:·26J
Sleep is on the plane or personal potential and characlerizes a way in whichwe
are capable or fixing our place in theworld.264 Dreaming is not a point 0 rstoppage(i.e
rest). but a relentless movementorinSll1bility preventing complete rest."Thedreamisan
allusion to a rerusal tosJeep within slecp-anallusion to the impossibiJiryorsleeping
which sleep becomes in the dream:·265 The dream isa rerusal or personality; "hewho
dre3mssleeps, but already hc who dreams is he who sleeps no longer. I-Ic is nOI another.
someolherperson,buttheprClllonitionorthcolhcr,orlhutwhichcannolsay'I'any
1110re, which recognizes itselrncither in itself nor in others.'·266
In accordancewilh his opcraling laworthe imaginarion-lhatthereiS110
imagil101yU'orld-Sartre'sirrealdreamworldisakindor'world'thathas no reality.267
Inordcrtodistinguishbetweenthcvarictyormeaning ignifiedby'world;lproposeto
describe the story-whose unrolding can litutes the world or reading and dreaming-as a
scene.268 In order to avoid applying detenllinacy to happenings thatbothBlanchotand
anrc explicitly note fortheirindetcnninacy, 'scenc' seems more appropriate than
'world.' Also, a scene does not need an actual moment in timc. The idea of the scene still
allows fora discussion, while simultancously describing the vantage pointoflhe dreamer
and reader as uninvolved and inactive. The reader and dreamer are therefore something
like an impersonal audience member, for example, and the emphasis should be on their
impersonality and their community.
According to Herschel Farbman,··dreamsare.in Blanchot'saccount,imagesof
the absence of the subject of the experience ofdreaming.,,269 Or as Foucault puts it: '"a
language without an assignablesubjecl. .. a personal pronoun withouta person.,,270
Neitherreadingnordreaminginvolvesaconversationconstituted by an interior language
because the dream, thestol)',or"the narrative ... unfolds a placeless place that is outside
all speech and wriling.,,271 While being engaged in reading means bci ng outside orany
possibilily for action, Blanchot's ignorant reader is like SarIrc'sdreamer;hedoesnot
utter lam reading. "The fact that weare in lhe position of strangers in the dream, this is
what first makes it slrange; and we are strnngers becausc the I of the dreamer does not
hn.vethemeaningofareall.'·272Sinceforgetfulness-forgetfulness implicates literary
readingasalwaysafirstreading-isrequiredofthercader,lhesame can be said of
Blanchot'sdreamer, meaning that drcams come to us as forgetfulness. Forgetfulness
t3kes its home in the imaginary world of the scene. BUl if a dream and a first reading
simply happelJ. then whal kind of happenings are these? The answer. I bel ieve.canbe
On reading. imagery, and Ihe notion oran imaginary world, Sanre wriles against
anyideaofimcrruption:
The scene: just as dreaming is lhe impossibility of sleep or repose, reading is an incessant
movemcnt.Therefore,thereader-drcamcrisdestitulcaccordingto Ihe movement of
DesoellVl'emenlislheabsenceofwork,inopcrativencss,andthcliteraryarlwork
itself. 274 Desoeuvl'emenr is manifested when we read a book, that is, when the book
disappearsnndthe narrative unfolds likeadream. DesoemJremenrisa"non-working
reserve that cannot be overcome by work:..21S As ilcannOl be overcome. itremains, but
not slagnantly or unimponantly. Desoem'remenr confronts us with its exigency and
demands a rcsponse. Instead of responding by way ofa capacily to overcome and attempt
to Lreat desoellvrementas an object of knowledge, 'Lhe exigency 0fworklessness'
establishes of an impossible, impersonal,andunknowablerelation
4.4. The Community of Readers
A reader never entirely exhausts the book because the book in its material reality
is Lhe object thaI createscoJnmuniLy. "It [lhebook] is Lhereasa web ofstablc meanings,
as the assertivencss which itowcstoa preestablished language, andas the enclosure, 100,
formedarounditbyLhecommunityofallreaders,amongwhoml,whohave not read it,
already have a place.,,278 The preestablished language evidenced by the book implies a
community, a communiLy that is based upon the framework ofpredetemlined
signilicaLion.l-!owever,thebookthaLhasnotbeenread-theliterarybookofliction-is
exactly what the reader wanLs to read,since it offers the unknown;"lhe reader has 110 use
fora work wrinen forhim.',279 Readers are communally implicaLed in not having read.
but instilled with the potential to do so. The community of readers is the community of
pOLential readers and for this reason Lhecommuniry is always impotentiaL The reader is
a!waysanonymous, I 'oeuvre dismisses its author, and thecommunityofreadersisalso
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communism, the reading community, or community in general, mean the refusal of both
institution and convention.281 Furthemlore:
Literary community is paradoxical by way of the desoeuvremem that opens a space for
the community of dispersed readers who are related only by that which they have not
read. Readers who grant literature existence form an impossible impersonal community.
Justasancanneverbetheaimofan~l.nist,anddeath(theotherimpossibility)
cannot be the aim ofsomcone attempting suicide, a communitycallnot ever be the object
ofa group's will coalescing.285 That which is so heavily dependenton nothingness can
neverbemadeillloadeliberatelywilledaction.Blanchotiancommunity"isaforlllof
cOlllmunity lhat leaves few concrete traces but whose nectingdepthisnonetheless
conveyed.,,286 It is conveyed through Blanchot'sformulationof friendshipbecausc
fricndshipfavoTStheunrcstrictcdnessofilllpersollality."Sucharecasting of friendship as
somethingatoncesingular,plural,personal.andilllpersollalexteIldstheconceptof
friendship to generally unchaned realms.,,287 Friendship, like coIlununity,isparadoxical
While friendship isconunonly held to be a rclation among at least two individual
pcrsons,Blanchot'sfriendshipistheil11pcrsonalpluralilyofliterarycommunity;itcannot
be reduced to personality, individuality, or the singularity of the cOlTIl11unalpairor
lTIuhiple.This irreducibility inherent in community finds its clearest political example in
lheeventsofMayl968
4.6.Communit)'and 1968
For literature to be literature it must be open toward thecol11l11unityofreadcrs.
Perhaps it calls fora new politics. This new politics of Blanchot ian community must be
anti-tolalitarian. Totalitarian politica] systcmsarc formcd by and aredepcndcnt upon
work. HavingwitncsscdthcactualityoftotalitariallisminGennan occupied France,
Blanchot cmphasizesa need to avoid the politics of power and work.Blanchotian
community, which is never the product of work. makes community something like the
artworkinaSllluchasneithcrcommunitynorlitcraturearcachievedthrough labor,
meaning they are not manufactured. If we follow the paradoxical example of I'oellvre,
then we avoid the nasty siluation ofa totalitarian politics.289
If we tum ouranenlian to the fannation of groups in explicitly (i.e.stereotypical)
political situations, such as lhestudent protests in France in 1968 for example, what
becomes evident is that a political community need not be united undertherhelaricafa
panisan agenda, a rallying speech,oraseriesofcammon and definablegoals.Rmher
thanthesebeingthepossiblebasisforthegroup.inl968weencounteragroupfounded
on (Jesoellvremem(which is impossible). '"The panicipants during May 1968 were not
protestingaboutanythinginpanicular.ltwasnalaquestianafapoliticalproject,oniya
general dissatisfaction with a world that does nOlpennit theextraordinarycriss-crossing
of relations at play amongst the participanls.,,290 Where the participantscouldnotbe
dcflnedpersonallyorbywhaltheyexplicitlysharcd,Blanchotbelicvednothingbula
malaise can be explicated from lhese evenIS and that lhis is whatconstitutes the radical
possibililyofan impersonal community (of which the events of 1968 serve as a
contemporary and paradigmatic case)
Blanchot brieny addresses theevenls of 1968 in an essay on Faucaultwrillenin
the spirit of friendship shot1ly afler Foucault's death. EntilledMicltelFollcolllrGsl
Il1IogineHil1l(MicheIFollcoulllelquejel'il1logine,1986),theessaybegins
The silence and impersonality of literature are nOlonly important for comrnunity,butfor
friendshipaswell;"silence,likeimpersonality,i a defining rather lhan an incidental
featureoffriendship.',l91 Instead of gathering around thal which is shared and familiar,
friendship should respect and greet the unknown. the exigency of desoem'remenf
Impersonality is perhaps the most fundamental featureofcomrnunityand
friendship. Impersonality is the essence of community and friendsh ip,soitcannotbe
conceivedofasanegativecharacteristic.19J lmpersonalityisattheheanofBlanchot's
depiction of May 1968, where anything was possible due to lheanonymityofothers.ln
fact,Blanchot'slifestyleisatestamenttolhesignificanceofthis impersonality, where he
figllresmorelikeaghostinthemodemtechnologicalanificeofphotographsand
information lhat is always available on Ihe intcrnct."Assomeone who refuses all pllblic
engagements,pholographs,andpersonalconl3ctintheliteraryworld,andhasdoneso
now forseveraldecades,Blanchot is one of those rare figuresaboutwhom very few
personal at1ribulesareknown.'·194 However, he provides somcwhat of an explanation for
this lifestyle in The Book To Come(LeLivrea Vel1;r, 1959),saying,"in the public, lhe
friend has no place.'·295
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Generally speaking, Agambcn's HomoSacerconcerns the relation 0 fpoliticsand
life on the working assumption that '''in Westem politics. bare life has the peculiar
pnvilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city ofmen.,,l99 The relationship
between life and politics is to be understood as biopoliricalon the basis of the state of
cxception,whichdenotestheinclusionofwhmeveri excludedasfonningthefoundation
of political inciusivity.JOOAgamben's immediate concern is that werecognizethat"thcre
ispoliticsbecausemanisthelivingbeingwho,inlanguage,separatesandopposes
bare life inan inciusiveexciusion."JO'Thisnotionofbare life,which I hold to be
significant in approaching a Blanchot ian polilicsoflitcrature,mcans the fundamental
status, capacity, or relation of being ablc lobc killed without it counting as homicide,
according to human law. or sacrifice, according 10 a divinc law.JO2
Bare life isa life at its point-zero,rcduccd,slrippcdofrecoursetoLaw.Thisstark
abstraction of life is evident in literature, especially when consideringtheaforemenlioned
discussion of death and literary language from chapter three, and specificallyBlanchot's
example of 'this woman.' Were it not for the (or her) elcmenml capacity to die, the death
announced when Blanchotsays 'this woman' would nol have itsduaI significance
naming toward presence. bUI offering only absence, asdealh. "Language is thus
constantly referring back to its origin in the essential bond between the existent being and
thepossibilityofdeaththatoffersthisbeingtolanguage.,,30J partoftheilllportanceof
'thiswolllan's' death-her bare life----is political in what Agalllben callslheoriginary
political relation: "'theoriginaryexception in whichhulllan life is inc1uded in the political
order in being exposed toan uncondilional capacity to be killed."J04Languageisthe
capacity to kill (i.e. negate) upon which the human self~consciousreality is founded; it
insislson the significance oflhe political as illlmemoriallyprimordial.Manifestedbythe
accoulltsofbolhAgambenandBlanchot,thekindoflifelhatanyonecankillis
represented in language as "an object of violence lhat exceeds the sphere bOlh of law and
ofsacrifice."30S
The violence thaI anyone can perfoml 011 the homo .'weer-the life of bare life-is
possible due to the fact that lhis person no longer falls lInderthe categoryofLaw;lhey
are exc1uded and set outside. "This violencc-theunsanctionablekillthat,inhis[homo
sacer] case, anyone may commit-is c1assifiable neither as sacrificenorasholllicide,
neither as the execution ofa condelllnation to death norassacrilegc."J06 Theviolenceof
languageinhercntin itscapacitytoannollncethe'realdealh,'whetherinliteraryor
everydayspcech,isnotaccountabletoLawbecause"itisnotonlythaI language signifies
in the possible absence of its speaker and its referent; it is that a'realdeath'has
occurred," and this 'realdeath'concemswhat Agamben refers to asbarelife.J07
Impersonality-the nOlion lhat is so significant in terms of the dealhoflhe
author-also points to the political import of literature. Authors who undergo 8 Ilecessary
death,adescent into impersonality,are also exposed to the originary political exception
3nd thus theycollstitutean important aspect of the political dimensionofliterature.The
aUlhor undergoes his or her own sacrifice, but Ihis8uthorial sacri fice is nol lobe
understoodasa sacrifice in temlS ofa productiveexpendilurc
absence of sacri fice or 'the ullsacrificeable,' del110nstratcs the pol ilic<llil11portofliterary
sacrifice, where that which isunsacrificcable issuspended,excluded. The reason the
dealhoftheaUlhorcannotbeaproducliveexpcllditureisduetolheactivityofwriling
itself,which in literature is never more Ihan the dcployl11cIll ofc!esoellvremelll,allseless
l11ovcl11cnLThereforeitisl11orcapproprialetodcscribelilcrarysacrificeinterl11softhe
unsacrificeable.Jean-LlIcNancyalsosuggcstslhatlhepoliticalsignificanceofliterature
particular, lInarguably nmsthroughollt--ordoubles-Ihe Western processofthe
~O~O~~u;iceB111nchol. Fal/x Pas. tmns.Chariotte Mllndel1 (Stanford. California: Stanford University Press.
spiritlializationofsacrifice,,,309Literarysacrificeissacrifice'ssllspension, preventing it
from beingovcrcome dialectically so as to make sacrifice be impotentially
The space of literature resembles the space of the concentration camps. "The
camps represent an absence of sacrifice. They bring into play an unexpected tension
betweensacrificeandtheabsenceofsacrifice."JIOBothliteratlire and the camps are
capableofdemonstratingsacrifice'sslispensioninaplacedevoidofLaw,wherc
extinctionandillcxistcncethrcaten.lnliteratureandthedeath camps weare confronting a
space that is unsacrificeable. What we are dealing with is the utter destitlltionofidentity:
"theverynatureofBlanchot'stholightistolinraveltheentangling bonds of identity."JI I
The Nazi death campsconstitlltc a topic taken up by Agamben ina latterportion
of Homo Sacer and also by Blanchot indirectly in The Wrifing ofthe Disaster. According
to Agamben, the atlempted extennination of the Jews represents"a llagrantcase ofa
homosacer," and the killing in the camps only affirms the capacity to be killed; hence, it
concerns the fundamental political relation of bare life. J12 ForBlanchol,thecampspoint
10 the space ofsllspension, where passivity isa nondialectical and literary revelation
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thecoreofpassivitybecauseitisantitheticaltodetermination.318 1n The Writingo!the
Disaster, Blanchot also considers the political import of Mel vi lie's Bartleby'
Because refusal is indecision as impotcntiality, it precedesdctennination. Therefore, the
essence of the political for Blanchot is this pre-decision capaci tyforpassiveindecisioll,a
slateofimpOlential passivity resistant to dialectical appropriation.Passivitymustbe
measureless since it is llondialecticallypre-political (i.e. pre-decision). To qualify this
characterization,Blanchotstresseslheconnectionbetweensituationsofpassivityand
For Blanchot, when Iheg/oba/l1egafiol1 properto/'oellvre implica teseverything
andeveryone,il ison the basis of this primordial capacity to be ki lied: the exception of
bare life. Death isa political concept according to bare lifebydefinitionandthus
language is inherently political. However, it is not merely thai language implies the
polilical,but that this political relation be passive rather than active. Consequently,
literature 1ll1lSt evidence a polilies of passivity, a politicsofcalaslrophe,or,asBlanchot
would (perhaps) have it: a politics of disaster; "it is what escapes the very possibility of
experiencc-il is the limil ofwriling. This mllst be repeated: the disasterde-scribes.,,320
A politics of passivity is first and foremosla politics in complcte diSlinction to the
politicsofaClionanddecision. It is a polilics Ihatpredicls, foreshadows, and dClermines
nothing, but sustains itself as a radical openness to new possibilitythroughils
impotenliality.This is why it is a politics of catastrophic vigilance.Howevcr.this
vigilance is not to be viewed as or inferrcd 10 be negativeoranarchistic.Rather,itisthe
willingness 10 be vigilant toward thc impotcntial fora radical calling-inlo-question.fora
catastrophe. This is why Blanchol would prefer a polilics ofpassivity, especially in lenns
oftheessenceofliteratureandlheliteraryexperience;ilisindecision.unimpositional:
The politicsofcataslrophe is ineffectual, like litcmture,<lndtherefore shares ilsessence
of the il11possibility at the hearl of/'oeuvre. I-Iere, there isonly Iheil11pcnding, but it
discussed in chapterlhree, the other death (both of which are nondialectical)
The catastrophe is never something we arc or can becomcconlemporarywith;it
cannot be sought ouland achicved. This is the same issuc confronledbytheanisl
rcgardingthcirintcntionalityandthecapacityforlheirpersonalitytosubven/'oeuvre:
WThelVriti"gojtheDisaster.29-JO
flltureforlhedisaster,jllstaslhere is no lillle or space for its
accolllplishlllent. 322
The impossibility of this politics, the essence of literature, of catastrophe, can only be
trcatcd as a paradox: "not to answer is lherule-ornot to receive any answer. This does
not suffice to stop questions. Blitwhenlheansweristheabsenccofanyanswcr, then the
question in tllrn becomes the absence of any question (the mortified qllestion).,,32.} The
radicalized questioning al play here, Illcaning in both polilics and literature, is a capacity
lorefllse;itislikethesilencclhatalwayseludesdeterlllination,blltisneverthelesslhere
What we fundamcntallyencounterin literaturc isnota politics determincdby
power, but by power's absence. Power is defincd as (or by) work, production,and,
cspeciallyinthepresent-daybytcchnologyormachines."Powerinthebroadestscnse-
capacity, ability-is likcthcpowcrofthegroup Icadcr: always relaLcdlodomination.
Machr [doing, as in powcr or slrenglh] is the means, lhclllachine,thcfunclioningofthe
possible.,,324 Whal I have called the politics of activity is esscntially synonymouswith
Ihepoliticsofpower;botharedrivenbydecision,initiativc,andthedesircfor(self)
rcproduction. 325
The politics of literature is a politics adhering to the always-impendingexigcncy
of disaster or cataslrophe in tenns ofa diligent vigilance. As the onlymcansof
comportment, "the disaster alone holds mastery at a distance," but not in the sense of
seizing-theMdayor becoming-master.326 This isa politicsofinstability and disarray, both
of which are featuresofthc litcrarycndcavor
The new politics-what I have bcen referring to as a politics of passivity-is
implicated with the impossibility at the hcartofliterature. Literaturedemonstralcsthe
decay of the will,an immobilizing loss ofpowcr, and Ihuscatastrophe. The only activity
attributable to litcrature is that of writing and it belongs to lhe absence of work and
possibility;"wrilingwithoutanyreferencetopower:thissupposesthatoncgobywayof
writing.,,321 Essentially, litcraturc provides a dissimulationofthepoliticsofactivityor
power by being catastrophic: "I can no longer appeal to any ethics,anyexperience,any
practicewhatever-savethatofsomecolinterMliving,whichistosayan llnMpractice, or
(perhaps) a work ofwriting.,,328 Writing isthlls indirectly pol itical:"Writing, sinccit
persists ina relationofirrcglliarity itselfwith itself-andthlls the utterly other-does not
know what will becomcofitpolitically: this is itsintransitivily, its necessarily indirect
relation to thepolilical.,,329
Like literature, the politics of passivity is a politics of failure: "failureis
inevitable, bUI the byways of failure are revelatory, for these contradictions are the reality
of the literarytask.,,3JO Writing lhatproduces the absence ofmcaningdoes not produce a
categorical product, bUI father a vigilant approach: theopennessofqucstioning.The
politics of passivity, vigilance, or watchfulness, isa fonnof passivity as careful
mindrulness.lranythingcouldbeconsidereditsslogan,lhenpcrhapsBlancholhas
writtenitbestrorhisliteratccomInunity:"keepwotchoverabsentmeonillg."J31
JJI The Wrilillg o!fhe Disasfer. 42
Blanchot'sentireliterarycndeavorbcginswiththequestionofartandits
possibility. What is art? I-Iow is somcthingcalledart possible? Can wctalkaboutitinany
llleaningfullycoherentway?lhaveelllphasizedthepoliticalandontologicalimplications
ofthequestionofart.'Whatisart'inquiresastothebeingoftheartwork; it asks about
the ontological status of the artwork. Also, if the question is aboutart,thcnitisa
politically charged qucstion for two reasons. First,literaturehasbcenhistorically
conditionedandimplicaledpolitically.forexalllplc,asamcansofexpressionorthrough
lhe censorship ofconlentious material. Secondly, art isinextricably linked to the political
throughlheessentialrefllsalthatBlanchotstresscsthrollghouthiswritingsspanninglllore
thanhalfacentllry. Yet what Illostconcerns Blanchot is how I'oe/lvre possesses the
aUlonolllyofrefusal
BlIt, what is Iiterature?L'oellvre is this question, but not its answer.ForBlanchot,
"oellvreisnotaninstrumenlOfcOIllI11Unication;ncitherisitausefuloutputforaction.lf
literature acts, then it acts ineffeclivelybecallsewhatcouldbemore subversive than the
insubordinalion of questioning inachain of means and ends? L'oellvreasthequestionof
JJ2 The Sf)(lCe ojLilemlltre, 247
literaturc's very possibility is the refusal of subordination, uscfulness.and
instrumentality. Fundamemalty, Blanchot's liternlUre is nOlcommiued toanything
Through/'oellvre'slackofcommitmem.literalurcexistsasapowerof
conlcstation.Thisisthemeaningofthcqucstionofliterature:thc refusal of the grounds
for choice or aClion in any decisive sense. Before therccan be poliLicalaction.theremut
be this foundationcondilioningaction; preceding an affinnative or negalive action is
always a rcfusal of both options, but this is nOl always clear. Howevcr,refusal is clearly
manifestcd in literature. An exists as this powerofcontcstation and thus artworks have a
characteristically political ontology, which I havcclaboratedthroughthethreadof
impossibility.
I have addressed Iheimpossibility of Blanchot'sLheoryofliteratureinthrceways
as it COl1cemsthree other major philosophers. ArisloLlc'simpotentiality allows/'oellvre to
have its peculiar ontological statllsofnot-yet-having-obtai ncd,ancxistellcelilliqllcly
impossiblc to conceptualize through traditional categories of process. As impotentiality,
I'oelll're has no necessarycxistence; it is not woven into the detennined fabric of nature
and for this reason the possibility of something called art is fascinating.Hegel'sdialectic,
driven bydcsireandpossibiJityofncgalion. iSlhcrele\'ambackgroundforestablishing
what cannot be worked upon in any meaningful sense. how art remits us to the impotence
of impossibility. and why Blanchot's literature is the place ofdesoeIll'remelll.Asthe
abenceofwork,l'oem'recannolbesomcthingsomeoneisinlentonproducing;l'oem.,.e
is precisely that which eludes being 3 product of an intenlionalconsciousness.lfone
cannot work toward the production of literature. thenartisticactivity is characterized by
uselesness.So.themakingoftheanworkisdistinctfromthemakingintethnological
achievement, as 1have shown through the medium of I-Ieidegger's essays on tee/me.
Since art is not a useful rendering, like technology. it hnsa separate ontological status
outside of the category of work as work's absence, (!esoeuvremem
Blanchofstheoryofartandliterntureasutterlydestituteandoutofworkis
reminiscemofdeath. but not death in the commonplace (i.e. possible)andmerely
biological meaning. Blanchot accepts the realityofa biological death,but in perhaps
whar constitutes an atheistic move heaffinns the importanceofan unthinkable.
impossibleorherdeath; this is the death in liternture.the impossibi lityofpossibility.
Art is not dead; it is not a dated medium or category. Rather. art confrontsuswith
thcrealityo[somcthingthatcannotbcassimilatcdbyconsciousncss; this is thc other
dcalhwithlhcaulonomyofrcfusal.lnaffirminglitcralure'sautonomyofrefusallhrough
Ihedeaththatisimpossible.Blanchotdcpicls/·oellvreasonlologically indcpcndcnL The
combinatory status of I'oeuvre as bearing both the aUlonomy ofrefusal and a non-
referential,non-dependentontologicalstatus makes it an 'objecl'ofconsequencefor
politicalonlology,whichisaciaimlderivefromBlanchot'swritings
A thooryofan implicated with dcath and impossibility also indicatcsapeculiar
typeofrclation with theanistic audience. which in the case of literature isacommunity
of readers. Blanchotseems to take up the question: how do we read what cannotbe
accomplished.yetisimponantfortheveryrensonthatitdocsnotobtain?The
community fascinatcd by this question is the condition ofa spccific literate community of
readers.llisnolenoughlhalabookbewrilten;illTIustbereadwbelheartworkas
I'oeuvre. Therefore, the community of readers is one of the condi tionsforthcpossibility
of literature because the unfolding of the narrative is much morethan thecontinllation of
an inner monologue, likea kind of daydreaming. There issomethingdream-likeabout
literaryreading,butnotinanysensethatrefersbacktoan'I'thinking. Consequently,
/'oeuvreisnomoretheproductofanallthorthanlheprodllctofanindividualreader,The
illlpersonalandcollllllunalneUlralityofart'sautonolllycannolbeunderstatedin
Blanchot'scase. Since the reader cannot be 100 involved (i.e. tooimpositional)in
/'oeuvregeneration,lhe reader Illust heed toa most profoundly passivcllnconcern
Throllgh Ihc passivity of the reader, we arrive at the insllbordinatefundalllentof
Blanchot's politics of literature. The connection that I havcelaborated bclween the
inabiliry for work and the refusal to bean aClive participant inlheworld,whichisakind
of passive insubordination, should evidence lhe new politics that Blanchot's theory of
Iilerature gestures toward. However, lhis isa politics that cannot be reduced to an agenda;
ifanything, it is like death because one cannot make a meaningfuI power out of that
which one does nol overcome (i,e. death)
What are we to do? Blanchot does not give an answer to thisqllestion.Perhapsit
isnotevenanappropriatequcstion.Whatwecando,however,isconcciveof Bartlebyas
excmplaryand remain vigilant fora new politics through the most profoundpassivc
unconcernlhrollgh literature, When we are truly passive we refllse.That which is purely
passive is art and it refuses liS measurelessly. This is Blanchot's catastrophe
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